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PROTECTING BATTERED WOMEN: A
PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK
I. Introduction
The problem of wife abuse' is so prevalent that it no longer
remains hidden behind urban tenement doors and suburban picket
fences. 2 It is estimated that, nationally, repeated violence between
spouses3 occurs in ten to twenty percent of all marriages. 4 Statistics
1. The term "wife," for the purposes of this Note, includes married women,
common law wives and female cohabitants.
This Note also uses the terms "wife abuse" and "domestic violence" inter-
changeably to refer to willful acts that cause pain and bodily injury, or force a
person to do something against her will or prevent her from doing something she
chooses to do. The terms do not extend here to verbal and other non-physical
abuse.
2. Wife abuse spans all races and socio-economic classes. See U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3 (1982) [hereinafter RULE OF THUMB]; see also R. LANGLEY
& R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 43 (1977) ("persons taking part in
[domestic] conflicts are of all ages, communities, income levels, races, religions,
employment situations, and marital status").
One study showed that the number of wife abuse cases reported in West Harlem,
New York City-a community of working-class blacks, some Latin-Americans and
a few whites-was roughly equivalent to the number of incidents reported in
Norwalk, Connecticut, a similar-sized community populated by upper-middle class
whites. See D. MARTN, BATTERED WIVES 19 (1981) (citing Bard, The Study and
Modification of Intra-family Violence, in THE CONTROL OF AGGRESSION AND VI-
OLENCE: COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 154 (1971)) [hereinafter MARTIN]. In its
first two months of operation, the Women's Center of Greater Danbury in Fairfield,
Connecticut, counseled 26 battered wives and found that "[aill but 2 of the abusive
men were professionals, including lawyers and physicians." Fields, Legal Remedies:
Part of the Cure for Battered Women, in IDENTIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF SPOUSE
ABUSE: HEALTH AND MENTAL HEALTH AGENCY ROLES 49 (A. Lurie & E. Quitkin
eds. 1980) [hereinafter Fields].
3. Although abuse may be perpetrated by either spouse, it is widely recognized
that the victims of long-term physical abuse are nearly always women. See L.
LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
SPONSE 1 n.3 (1981) [hereinafter LERMAN]; Hamlin, The Nature and Extent of
Spouse Assault, in LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES 1 (1980) [hereinafter DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE]; see also R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
14-15 (1979) ("the use of force between adults in the home is systematically and
disproportionately directed at women") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter DOBASH &
DOBASH]. For this reason, and because the use of gender-neutral terms here would
obscure the true nature of domestic violence, this Note identifies and addresses
the problem in terms of abused women. See id. at 11-12.
4. See NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FIRST
REPORT 4 (1986) (citing R. GELLES, S. STEINMETZ & M. STRAUS, BEHIND CLOSED
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reveal that wife abuse is equally wide-spread within New York State.
In 1984, 145 people in New York were murdered by a family
member.5 In 1985, 28,375 calls to the police concerned incidents of
wife abuse. 6
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 18 (1980)) [hereinafter N.Y. GOVERNOR'S
REPORT]. The severity of the domestic violence problem should be measured not
only by its epidemic proportions but also by the brutal nature of the attacks. See
Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 1657, 1670 (1981) ("[a] comparison of assaults by spouses with other kinds
of attacks demonstrates that domestic victims are much more likely to be seriously
injured [and] to require medical attention and hospitalization") [hereinafter Marcus].
Experts on the subject of domestic violence report that wives have been "raped,
choked, stabbed, shot, beaten, had their jaws and limbs broken, and have been
struck with horse whips, pokers, bats, and bicycle chains." RULE OF THUMB, supra
note 2, at 2-3.
Although wives are the direct victims of spouse abuse, they are not the only
ones who suffer. Children, even if they escape the violence themselves, often witness
the violence directed against their mothers. See MARTIN, supra note 2, at 22.
Children were present in 43076 of all domestic violence occurrences in New Jersey
during 1984. See G. GOOLKASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 10 (National Institute of Justice, May 1986) (citing
CRIME IN NEW JERSEY: 1984 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 181 (N.J. Division of State
Police 1985)) [hereinafter GOOLKASL4N]. In the West Harlem study, children were
present in 41% of the cases in which police intervened. See MARTIN, supra note
2, at 22 (citing Bard, The Study and Modification of Intra-family Violence, in
THE CONTROL OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 161
(1971)). The children who witness domestic violence may suffer emotional trauma.
See id. Furthermore, a child exposed to a pattern of intra-family violence is more
likely to grow up to be an abusive spouse. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at
3. " '[O]ne out of ten of the husbands [of the 2,143 families studied] who grew
up in violent families are wife beaters in the sense of serious assault. This is over
three times the rate for husbands who did not grow up in such violent homes.' "
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting R. GELLES, S. STEINMETZ & M. STRAUS, BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 122 (1980)). One commentator
observed that "isolated instances of domestic violence [carry] the potential for ever-
increasing patterns of violence." MARTIN, supra note 2, at 23.
5. See N.Y. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (citing N.Y. STATE DIV. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM DATA (1984)).
6. See N.Y. STATE Drw. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., 1984 CRIME & JUSTICE
ANNUAL REPORT 112 (1985). The victims included legal and common law wives.
See id. Reported abuses included aggravated assault, simple assault, sex offenses
and violations of protective orders. See id. The 1985 statistics comport with a
steady increase in reported incidents of domestic violence since data collection began
in 1980: in 1980, 4,942 incidents of wife assault were reported. See N.Y. STATE
Div. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., 1980 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 273
(1980). In 1981, 13,709 cases of wife victimization were reported. See N.Y. STATE
DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., 1981 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT (1981). In
1982, 17,033 incidents were reported. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERVS., 1982 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT (1982). In 1983, 22,216 incidents
of wife abuse were reported. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS.,
1983 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 119 (1983). In 1984, there were 24,970
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Acts of domestic violence are often undeniably criminal in nature.7
The criminal justice system, however, has often treated domestic
violence as a private family matter:' when violence is directed at
wives, police often fail to arrest the batterer; 9 prosecutors frequently
do not prosecute;' 0 and the few cases that do reach the courts" may
be subject to judicial leniency.' 2 The frequent failure of the criminal
reported incidents of wife abuse. See N.Y. STATE DIv. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS.,
1984 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 122 (1984).
7. See supra note 4.
8. An expert in the area of domestic violence has observed: "The sanctity of
the family home pervades the world of law enforcement. A man's home is his
castle, and police, district attorneys, and judges hesitate to interfere with what goes
on behind that tightly closed door." MARTIN, supra note 2, at 87.
Although states provide criminal penalties for assault and battery, they rarely
impose these penalties upon spouses who abuse their mates. See Lerman, Landis
& Goldzweig, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, in ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEG-
ISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION 39, 43 (1983) ("mate abuse has not tradi-
tionally been treated as a criminal matter").
9. Police officers exercising discretion "are very unlikely to make an arrest
when [an] offender has used violence against his wife." DOBASH & DOBASH, supra
note 3, at 207 (emphasis in original). Police make fewer arrests for violent acts
directed by husbands against their wives than for similar acts directed by strangers
against strangers. The results of a 1967 study of police response and court disposition
in Washington, D.C., showed that 75% of assault cases involving strangers or unrelated
people ended in arrest and court adjudication, "whereas only 16o of all cases
involving assaults in the family ended in arrest and trial." Id.
10. Heavy caseloads, a perception that most domestic violence crimes are trivial,
and a belief in the sacrosanctity of the family unit cause prosecutors to give
domestic violence cases low priority in their casesloads. See LERMAN, supra note
3, at 13, 33.
11. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 4, at 81. Goolkasian states that "[flew domestic
violence cases actually reach trial, and those that do often involve particularly
serious or repeated violent crimes." Id.
12. Judges sometimes fail to impose upon a husband who assaults his wife
punishment commensurate with that imposed for a similiar violent crime between
strangers. See id. at 83.
Historically, American courts not only refused to protect battered wives but actually
condoned wife-beating. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 12 ("arly law of
many American States expressly endorsed the right of a husband to punish his
wife physically"). In 1824, the Supreme Court of Mississippi became the first court
to proclaim that a husband had a right to chastise his wife. See Bradley v. State,
2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824). The court held that a husband should be "permitted.
to exercise the right of moderate chastisement . . . without being subjected to
vexatious prosecution, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties
concerned." Id. at 158.
The courts were slow to disavow the right of chastisement. In 1868, the North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal of a man indicted for assault and
battery upon his wife. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868). The
court observed that "the ground upon which we have put this decision is not that
the husband has the right to whip his wife . . . but that we will not interfere with
family government in trifling cases." Id. at 459.
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justice system to punish a batterer signals to him, as well as to his
victim and the public in general, that wife abuse is not criminal
behavior and that it is an acceptable practice.'
Legislation can be vital to reshaping criminal justice system prac-
tices. 14 A number of state legislatures have recently demonstrated
their dissatisfaction with police, prosecutors and courts whose failure
to enforce existing law has led to the de facto decriminalization of
spouse abuse. 5 These states have enacted comprehensive domestic
Even those courts that no longer expressly condoned wife-beating continued to
adhere to a policy of nonintervention in the absence of great injury. See, e.g.,
State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367, 368 (1879) (no invasion of "domestic forum ...
unless some permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence");
State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) (husband has no right to chastise wife
but absent permanent injury or dangerous violence "it is better to draw the curtain,
shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive").
It was not until the late 19th century that the courts expressly held wife-beating
unlawful and acknowledged that a wife was "entitled, in person and in property,
to the fullest protection of [a state's] laws." Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 147
(1871) (husband not permitted by law to "correct" wife); see also Commonwealth
v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871) (beating of wife unlawful); Harris v. State,
71 Miss. 462, 464, 14 So. 266, 266 (1894) (overruling Bradley as "revolting prec-
edent").
Even today, however, evidence shows that some courts do not fully appreciate
the Serious nature of domestic violence. See, e.g., Orloff v. Orloff, 49 A.D.2d
975, 975, 373 N.Y.2d 888, 890 (3d Dep't 1975) (isolated threat, by wife with
handgun held insufficient ground for divorce); Rios v. Rios, 34 A.D.2d 325, 326,
311 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666 (1st Dep't 1970) (to obtain a separation, party "must either
establish a pattern of actual physical violence or ... conduct must be such as
seriously affects the health of the spouse and threatens to impair it and renders
it unsafe to cohabit"), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 840, 277 N.E.2d 786, 327 N.Y.S.2d
853 (1971).
13. When police fail to arrest them:
Men ... [get] the message from police officers that woman battering
is not a crime and that the sanctions of the criminal justice system-
sanctions which presumably exist to deter and punish those who have
the inclination to behave in antisocial ways-are routinely not invoked
by police officers and that therefore they have nothing to fear if they
beat the women with whom they are, or were, involved.
Paterson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, in BATTERED WOMEN
82-83 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
In a victim's own words: "My husband doesn't think he did anything wrong,
and as long as he thinks like that, it's a problem." Interview with domestic violence
victim, Urban Women's Shelter, Central Harlem, New York City (Feb. 13, 1987).
14. See GOOLKASLAN, supra note 4, at 20. Legislation can also affect societal
attitudes and influence social change. See MARTIN, supra note 2, at 174.
15. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text. Significantly, "[t]he fact that
[these] states have recently enacted laws specifically prohibiting wife-beating ...
demonstrates that the law has treated and regarded this form of violent behavior
as quite different from the less common violence between strangers." J. FLEMING,
STOPPING WIn ABUSE: A GUIDE To THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL
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violence statutes that establish specific arrest practices, 6 and pro-
secutorial and judicial responsibilities.17 Moreover, several states have
made arrest of batterers mandatory in certain instances. 8
New York State, however, lacks a specific statutory provision to
guide law enforcement officials' response to domestic violence.' 9
Existing domestic violence legislation in New York is limited primarily
to providing improved court access for victims. 20 Ultimately, whether
a batterer will be brought before the courts at all depends greatly
on whether police exercise their arrest powers. 2' If unchecked by
legislative intervention, New York's current policy of discretionary
arrest will continue to allow the police to avoid making arrests in
cases of domestic violence. 22 Without statutorily mandated arrest for
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER 153 (1979)
[hereinafter FLEMING].
16. For a discussion of state statutes establishing arrest practices for domestic
violence, see infra notes 226-43 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the prosecutorial and judicial responsibilities established
by domestic violence legislation, see infra notes 305-27 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of mandatory arrest statutes, see infra notes 235-55 and
accompanying text.
19. This proposition has two minor exceptions. New York has specifically granted
police officers the authority to arrest violators of protection orders when the domestic
violence victim presents an officer with a copy of the order. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 530.12(8) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168(1) (McKinney 1983).
New York also currently requires police officers to notify domestic violence vic-
tims of their legal rights and remedies. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1987); N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 812(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
Otherwise, the New York general warrantless arrest provisions apply when police
respond in instances of domestic violence. See infra note 134 and accompanying
text.
20. For a discussion of existing judicial remedies, see infra notes 51-98 and
accompanying text.
21. The discretion accorded the police gives them the power to effectuate the
entire penal process. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J.
543, 543 (1960) [hereinafter Goldstein]; see also RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2,
at 91 ("police stand at the entrance to the justice system, and their actions often
prevent or discourage battered women from pursuing criminal remedies against their
abusers").
22. Regarding the general use of discretion by police officers, Goldstein suggests:
The ultimate answer is that the police should not be delegated discretion
not to invoke the criminal law[;] ... [they] should operate in an at-
mosphere which exhorts and commands them to invoke impartially all
criminal laws .... Responsibility for the enactment, amendment, and
repeal of the criminal laws will not, then, be abandoned to the whim
of each police officer or department, but retained where it belongs in
a democracy-with elected representatives.
Goldstein, supra note 21, at 586-87 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the
ineffectiveness of discretionary arrest in instances of domestic violence, see infra
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domestic violence, batterers will continue to view their actions as
legally permissible and women will continue to be beaten.23
This Note proposes that New York implement a state-wide man-
datory arrest policy for certain types of spouse abuse. Part II of
this Note examines the approach of the New York Legislature to
the problem of domestic violence, including previous attempts at
decriminalization, current judicial remedies and the efficacy of pro-
tection orders. 24 Part III discusses the ineffectiveness of discretionary
arrest in instances of spouse abuse and the advantages of mandatory
arrest legislation. 25 Part IV discusses domestic violence statutes en-
acted by other states as potential models for New York.26 Part V
argues for the implementation of mandatory arrest legislation in
New York and sets forth a proposal for comprehensive domestic
violence legislation, including a provision for mandatory arrest. 27
Finally, this Note concludes that mandatory arrest legislation is nec-
essary to curb domestic violence in New York State.
II. New York's Legislative Response to Domestic Violence
Currently, specific domestic violence legislation in New York State
is limited primarily to providing improved court procedures and
greater access for victims. 28 As originally enacted, the Family Court
notes 135-38 and accompanying text. For an example of guidelines, adopted at the
departmental level by the New York City police, which limit discretionary arrest
in instances of domestic violence, see infra note 172.
23. See supra note 13.
24. See infra notes 28-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 99-221 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 222-55 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 256-327 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 51-98 and accompanying text. Recently, the legislature has
focused on improving non-judicial relief, such as social services, for victims. In
1977, the legislature authorized the Board of Social Welfare to approve the estab-
lishment and operation of shelters for battered women accompanied by minor children.
See 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 450 (codified at N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 2(32) (McKinney
Supp. 1987), 371(22) (McKinney 1983)). A subsequent amendment encouraged women
to seek refuge in shelters by providing for reimbursement to them for the cost of
their lodging. See 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 688, § 1 (codified at N.Y. EXEc. LAW
§ 626 (McKinney Supp. 1987)). Moreover, the legislature also enacted a revenue-
producing mechanism to support programs that respond to and prevent family violence.
See Children and Family Trust Fund Act, 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 960 (codified at N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 481-a to -f (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
The Governor's Task Force on Domestic Violence influenced the passage of some
of these provisions. See TASK FORCE ON DoMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
SECOND REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND TiE LEGISLATURE 17 (1982) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE SECOND REPORT]. The Task Force, now called the Governor's Commission
on Domestic Violence, was established within the Executive Department by Executive
Order No. 90 in 1979. See id. at 37. Since then, the Commission has been a force
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Act relegated incidents of domestic violence to civil adjudication.2 9
Subsequent amendments, however, expanded the available judicial
remedies to include access to criminal court.30
A. The Original Family Court Act
In 1962, the New York State Legislature enacted the "Family
Offenses Proceedings" article (Article 8)31 of the Family Court Act.32
By establishing procedures for obtaining civil protection orders in
family court, the legislature intended to provide a conciliatory
alternative33 to filing charges34 against an abusive spouse.
The goal was "practical help" for the family rather than pun-
ishment for the offender.35 Article 8 vested the family court with
"exclusive original jurisdiction ' 3 6 over proceedings concerning acts
of disorderly conduct or assault37 between spouses, parent and child,
behind improved support services for battered wives in New York State. Past efforts
included establishing a state-wide toll-free hotline, see id. at 16, and drafting, with
the New York State Department of Health, a hospital memorandum and protocol
setting forth the responsibilities of hospital staff towards victims of domestic violence.
See N.Y. GoVER1UOR's REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
29. See infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 51-98 and accompanying text.
31. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, §§ 811-846 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 812-847 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)).
32. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, §§ 111-1019 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 111-1211 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)). The New York Family Court was
established by a 1961 amendment to the New York State Constitution. See N.Y.
CON ST. art. VI, § 13(a) ("Family court of the state of New York is hereby
established").
33. See REPORT OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION No.
2-THE FAmy COURT ACT, reprinted in 1962 N.Y. Laws 3428, 3444 [hereinafter
COMMITrEE REPORT]. "The aim is not punishment, but practical help. Depending on
the circumstances, this help may require an order of protection, support or conci-
liation." Id.; see also People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.2d 274, 278, 248 N.E.2d 8, 9, 300
N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (1969) (purpose of Family Court Act is ameliorative); People ex
rel Clifford v. Krueger, 59 Misc. 2d 87, 90, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990, 994 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1969) (legislative purpose underlying family court is to provide " 'practical
help' " in family disputes).
34. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 3444. The committee found that
wives who brought criminal charges against their husbands generally sought one of
three ends: (1) to conciliate; (2) to compel him to leave home; or (3) to make him
stop beating her-and not conviction. See id. The committee thus concluded that
"[g]iven the actual purposes that prompt wives to make 'criminal charges' of disorderly
conduct or assault, . . . these concerns should be treated in the [flamily [c]ourt by
means of a civil proceeding." Id.
35. See id.
36. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 812 (current version at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 812 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)); see also People v. De Jesus, 21 A.D.2d 236,
238, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (4th Dep't 1964) (family court is court of first resort).
37. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 812 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 812 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)).
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or members of the same family or household."8 Complaints filed in
criminal court were transferred to the family court,39 which had sole
power to determine if these instances of spouse abuse should be
treated as crimes and returned to the criminal court.40
38. See id. "Spouses" and "household" were narrowly defined: a divorced spouse
could not petition the court, see People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.2d 274, 283-84, 248
N.E.2d 8, 13, 300 N.Y.S.2d 89, 96 (1969) (no purpose in family court jurisdiction
when goal of salvaging marriage is gone), nor could an unmarried cohabitant. See
People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 112-13, 261 N.E.2d 637, 640, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719,
722-23 (1970) (cohabitants excluded from family court because public policy does
not favor preserving these relationships); People v. Ostrander, 58 Misc. 2d 383, 385-
86, 295 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295-96 (Dutchess County Ct. 1968) (same).
39. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 813 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 813 (McKinney 1983)); see also People v. Radison, 40 Misc. 2d 1063, 1065, 244
N.Y.S.2d 941, 943-44 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963) (criminal complaint must be
transferred by criminal court to family court unless family court has transferred
proceeding to criminal court); cf People v. Hebmann, 54 Misc. 2d 666, 668, 283
N.Y.S.2d 179, 181-82 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1967) (because criminal court lacked
jurisdiction, escape charges brought against defendant arraigned in criminal court
must be dismissed).
40. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 814 (repealed 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 449,
§ 2); see also People v. Berger, 40 A.D.2d 192, 193, 338 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (3d
Dep't 1972) (family offense not a crime unless family court so determines); People
ex rel Clifford v. Krueger, 59 Misc. 2d 87, 90-91, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990, 994 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1969) (same). This provision, in effect, decriminalized domestic
violence. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Family Offenses in New York: A Recon-
sideration of the Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 601,
610 (1980) ("during any particular year for which statistics are available, only
two to three percent of all family offense cases were transferred by the family
court to a criminal court") [hereinafter Choice of Forum].
Nonetheless, although all assaults were statutorily within the jurisdiction of the
family court, the courts still disagreed as to when, if ever, the criminal court
could have initial jurisdiction over cases of serious assault. Compare People v.
Johnson, 20 N.Y.2d 220, 224, 229 N.E.2d 180, 182-83, 282 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484-
85 (1967) (family court has original jurisdiction over felonious assault) and
People v. Battaglia, 39 A.D.2d 833, 833, 333 N.Y.S.2d 47, 47 (4th Dep't 1972)
(family court has exclusive original jurisdiction over assault) and People v. De
Jesus, 21 A.D.2d 236, 241-42, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317, 324 (4th Dep't 1964) (family
court has jurisdiction over all assaults, not just misdemeanors) and Seymour v. Sey-
mour, 56 Misc. 2d 546, 547, 289 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Family Ct. Tioga County
1968) (all intra-family assaults are within jurisdiction of family court) with People
v. Klaff, 35 Misc. 2d 859, 861, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1962) (felony assault has no place in family court).
The courts also disagreed as to whether family court jurisdiction over felony
assault unconstitutionally deprived the grand jury of its power to indict. Compare
People v. De Jesus, 21 A.D.2d 236, 240-41, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317, 323-24 (4th Dep't
1964) (delegation of jurisdiction over assault to family court does not conflict
with constitutional power of grand jury) with Ricapito v. People, 38 Misc. 2d
710, 712, 238 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), aff'd, 20 A.D.2d
567, 245 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1963) (family court jurisdiction conflicts with
grand jury right to indict). Moreover, distinguishing between assault and attempted
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A spouse, family member or an agent authorized by statute4'
initiated a proceeding in family court by filing a petition42 alleging
that the respondent spouse had committed a proscribed act. 43 The
court, at the conclusion of a dispositional hearing" either: (1) dis-
missed the petition; (2) suspended judgment; (3) placed the respondent
on probation; or (4) issued an order of protection. 45 The order of
protection was limited in duration to one year, and its prohibitions,
which emphasized protection of children rather than the abused
murder, of which assault is an element, meant the difference between civil and
criminal penalties. See People v. Bronson, 39 A.D.2d 464, 465, 337 N.Y.S.2d
215, 217 (4th Dep't 1972) (family court does not have jurisdiction over attempted
murder); Whiting v. Shepard, 35 A.D.2d 11, 12-13, 312 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (3d
Dep't 1970) (family court has jurisdiction only over enumerated acts, not over
attempted murder); People v. Vaughn, 99 Misc. 2d 991, 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d 621,
623 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1979) (family court lacks jurisdiction over attempted
murder even though assault is an element). But see People ex rel Balk v. Warden,
46 A.D.2d 224, 225, 362 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181-82 (2d Dep't 1974) (family court
has jurisdiction over defendant charged with both attempted murder and assault;
distinguishing Bronson, in which defendant was charged only with attempted
murder).
41. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 822 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 822 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)). This section allowed a petition to
be filed by "[a]ny person in the relation to the respondent of spouse, parent,
child, or member of the same family or household: ... [a] duly authorized
agency, association, society, or institution; ... [a] peace officer; . . . [or a]
person on the court's own motion." Id.
42. See id. § 821 (current version at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 821 (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1987)).
43. See id. § 821(a).
44. See id. § 833 (entitled "Definition of 'dispositional hearing' ") (current
version at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 833 (McKinney 1983)). Prior to the dispositional
hearing, see id. § 835 (entitled "Sequence of hearings") (current version at N.Y.
FAm. CT. ACT § 835 (McKinney 1983)), the court held an adjudicatory hearing
to determine if the allegations of the petition were supported by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence. See id. § 832 (entitled "Definition of 'adjudicatory
hearing' ") (current version at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 832 (McKinney 1983) (entitled
"Definition of 'fact-finding hearing' ")).
45. See id. § 841 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841 (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1987)). The order of protection prescribed "reasonable conditions
of behavior" to be observed by either petitioner or respondent or both. Id.
§ 842 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp.
1987)). The order might require that the party:
[S]tay away from the home, the other spouse or the child; . . . permit
a parent to visit the child at stated periods; . . . abstain from offensive
conduct against the child or against the other parent or against any
person to whom custody of the child is awarded; . . . give proper
attention to the care of the home; ... [or] refrain from acts of
commission or omission that tend to make the home not a proper place
for the child.
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spouse, could also be imposed upon the petitioner. 46 Sanctions for
willful violation of the order were limited to incarceration for a
maximum of six months.4 7 Furthermore, disposition of the petition
by the family court barred any subsequent criminal proceedings on
the same offense.48
B. Current Judicial Remedies
Today, New York's criminal courts have jurisdiction concurrent
with that of the family court. Concurrent jurisdiction has not only
made additional judicial remedies available to the victim of domestic
violence 4 9 but has also increased the availability of the traditional,
and most frequently sought remedy-the order of protection. 0
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction
In the late 1970's, the New York State Legislature began amending
Article 8 of the Family Court Act to de-emphasize conciliation as
the solitary goal of judicial intervention." Amended language further
indicated the reorientation of Article 8; the purpose of a family
court proceeding now is "to stop the violence, end the family
disruption and obtain protection. '5 2 The legislature recognized that
in order to uphold its primary responsibility-protecting abused
wives-penal alternatives might be necessary. 3
The most significant amendment to Article 8 provided the criminal
court with original jurisdiction that was concurrent with that of the
46. See id.
47. See id. § 846 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846-a (McKinney
1983)).
48. See id. § 845 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 845 (McKinney
1983)).
49. See infra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
52. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 1983). The statutory language
illustrates the evolving orientation of the statute from conciliation to protection.
Prior to the adoption of the current version, the stated purpose of the Family
Court Act was to "keep the family unit intact." 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 449,
amended by 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 416. This was a goal much more consistent
with the original intent of the Act-securing "practical help" and "conciliation."
1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 811, repealed by 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 416.
53. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT intro, commentary 125, 128 (McKinney 1983)
(among legislators, there was "a new consensus, namely: that the process of
decriminalization had gone too far; that, by emphasizing the treatment of offenders




family court.5 4 Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the family court and
criminal court are now largely identical," except that criminal court
has exclusive jurisdiction over first-degree assault.56
The legislature's recent expansion of the definition of "household
member" to include former spouses and unmarried persons who
have a child in common, provides greater court access than did the
original version of Article 8.17 The victimized household member
has the choice of forum," and arrest is not a prerequisite to
54. See 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 449, § 1 (codified at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987)) (concurrent jurisdiction). In approving the amended
act, former New York Governor Carey observed that "[b]y giving criminal courts
concurrent original jurisdiction over these family matters, this legislation now
makes available the entire range of criminal sanctions which would have been
applicable had the crime not occurred within a family or household." Governor's
Memorandum on Approval of ch. 449, N.Y. Laws (July 19, 1977), reprinted in
1977 N.Y. Laws 2501 (McKinney); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1)
(McKinney 1984) (effective June 24, 1980) (concurrent jurisdiction).
55. See N.Y. Ca-M. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney 1984); see also N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
56. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982). The 1980
amendment divesting family court of jurisdiction over first degree assault, see
1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 530, § 5, signified the legislature's increasing recognition of
the serious nature of domestic violence. See Governor's Memorandum on Approval
of chs. 530, 531 and 532, N.Y. Laws (June 24, 1980), reprinted in 1980 N.Y.
Laws 1877, 1877-78 (McKinney) [hereinafter Governor's Memorandum on Ap-
proval]. Former New York Governor Carey, quoting the Justice Subcommittee,
stated:
This exclusion, like the present exclusion of attempted murder, is a
public policy statement that serious acts of violence between family
members will not be tolerated. Violence in the home is as serious a
breach of public order and safety as violence in the streets. Family
violence is learned by children who take the violent response into the
schools and streets, and later transmit it to their children.
Id. at 1878.
57. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also N.Y.
CRIl. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney 1984). The statute still does not provide
access to family court for unmarried cohabitants, unless they have a "child in
common." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
58. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 530.11(2) (McKinney 1984). Court personnel must inform the victim
of the distinction between the two proceedings:
[A] family court proceeding is a civil proceeding and is for the purpose
of attempting to stop the violence, end family disruption and obtain
protection ... [while] a proceeding in the criminal courts is for the
purpose of prosecution of the offender and can result in a criminal
conviction of the offender.
Id.; N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 812(2) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 216(1)
(McKinney 1983) (imposing duty upon chief administrator of courts to designate ap-
propriate persons to provide information to victims).
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proceeding in either court.5 9 Once the victim selects a forum, however,
she is barred from proceeding in the alternate forum by either a
finding on the merits of the petition or complaint, or a lapse of
seventy-two hours following filing of the petition or criminal in-
strument. o
Both courts are also authorized to issue temporary 6' and permanent 62
orders of protection. Furthermore, under amended Article 8, if the
victim presents a police officer with either a civil or criminal court
issued protection order, the police officer has authority to arrest
the violator 3.6 Despite the overlap between the courts, however, their
59. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(f) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 530.11(2)(f) (McKinney 1984).
60. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(e) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 100.07(2) (McKinney 1981); id. § 530.11(2)(e) (McKinney 1984).
Family court jurisdiction is not barred if, when the family court is not in session,
the defendant is initially brought before the criminal court in order for the victim
to obtain a temporary restraining order against him. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821(4)
(McKinney 1983). Criminal court jurisdiction will also not be barred if a family court
judge, in his discretion, transfers a matter initiated in family court to criminal court.
See id. § 813(1) (former § 813 mandating transfer from criminal court to family court
was repealed by 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 449, § 2).
In addition, there is a loophole created by the interplay of these statutes:
nothing expressly prohibits commencement of an action in criminal court within
72 hours of filing a family court petition. See Choice of Forum, supra note 40,
at 616. Furthermore, there is no express requirement that a criminal action be
terminated upon commencement of a family court action. See N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 821 practice commentary 165, 166-67 (McKinney 1983). New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 530.11(4), however, which requires notice of the filing of
a criminal complaint to the family court in which a proceeding is pending,
represents an attempt to close this loophole. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(4)
(McKinney 1984).
61. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 828 (McKinney 1983) (temporary order after petition
filed); id. § 1029 (McKinney 1983) (temporary order before or after filing petition
under "Child Protective Proceedings" article); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 530.12(1), (3) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987) (temporary orders obtainable when
criminal action is pending, or ex parte after filing complaint and for good cause
shown).
62. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT §§ 841(d) (McKinney 1983), 842 (McKinney 1983
& Supp. 1987) (order of protection for period not in excess of one year); see
also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (order of pro-
tection in addition to other disposition upon conviction).
63. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168(1) (McKinney 1983) ("[tlhe presentation
of a copy of an order of protection or temporary order of protection . .. to
any ... police officer shall constitute authority for him to arrest a person charged
with violating the terms of such order"); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 530.12(8) (McKinney 1984) (same). These sections also reauire that the court clerk
issue a copy of the order to the respondent or defendant, see id., and file another
copy with the local sheriff or police department. See N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW
§ 530.12(6) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168(2) (McKinney 1983); see
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purposes and dispositional alternatives remain, for the most part,
distinct .64
The purpose of a family court proceeding-to obtain a civil rem-
edy-has remained essentially unchanged, as have the available dis-
positional alternatives. 65 Concurrent jurisdiction, however, now
provides the victim with an election of remedies when a family court
protection order is violated. 66 When a spouse has violated a condition
of an order of protection issued by the family court, the victim has
three alternatives.6 7 First, she may re-petition the family court, which
can issue a new order of protection based on the recent offense.
68
also N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT §§ 155, 155-a (McKinney 1983) (post-arrest and admission
to bail procedures for adults arrested for violating family court order of protection or
for committing family offense or pursuant to court warrant).
64. See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
65. The available dispositions include dismissal of the petition, suspension of judg-
ment, imposition of probation or issuance of a protection order. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 841 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987). As a result of a recent amendment, see 1980 N.Y.
Laws ch. 531, § 1, the act now requires that a respondent placed on probation partici-
pate in an educational program. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841(c) (McKinney 1983).
The conditions suggested by the legislature for inclusion in an order of
protection have been amended since the 1962 enactment to include: (1) requiring
a petitioner or respondent to participate in an educational program, see id.
§ 842(g); (2) requiring a person to pay for the injured party's medical expenses
arising from the incident, see id. § 842(h); and (3) requiring the person to pay
the other party's reasonable counsel fees or disbursements incurred in obtaining
or enforcing the order. See id. § 842(f). The enumerated conditions are only
suggestions-the court may impose conditions of its own devisal limited only by
a requirement that they be reasonable. Cf. Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 123 Misc. 2d
771, 773, 474 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (Family Ct. Richmond County 1984) ("stated
purpose of family offense proceedings must be the measure by which the rea-
sonableness of an order of protection is determined").
66. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 847 (McKinney 1983). Section 847 provides:
An assault, attempted assault or other family offense as defined in
section eight hundred twelve of this article which occurs subsequent to
the issuance of an order of protection under this article shall be deemed
a new offense for which the petitioner may elect to file a violation of
order of protection petition, or a new petition or initiate a proceeding
in a criminal court.
Id.
67. See People v. Mosley, 121 Misc. 2d 4, 6, 467 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (Syracuse
City Ct. 1983) ("we read section 847 of the Family Court Act to provide to a
complainant three alternative courses of action once an assault allegedly occurs
subsequent to the issuance of an order of protection") (dictum). But see People
v. Hayden, 129 Misc. 2d 444, 445, 493 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (Suffolk County Ct.
1985) (not party's own election when state decides to prosecute), aff'd, 128
A.D.2d 726, 513 N.Y.S.2d 220 (2d Dep't 1987).
68. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 847 (McKinney 1983) (entitled "Election by
petitioner; certain cases"); id. § 821 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987) (entitled
"Originating proceedings").
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Second, she may file a violation of protection order petition69 with
the family court, which can then issue a warrant for the violator's
arrest.70 If the court finds a willful violation, it may modify the
existing order, impose a new order, or commit the offender to jail
for a maximum of six months. 71 Third, the victim may file an
accusatory instrument with the criminal court and commence criminal
proceedings on the underlying offense. 72
In contrast a criminal court proceeding-the purpose of which
is to prosecute the offender-can result in conviction 73 and the
imposition of penal sanctions. 74 The criminal court is also authorized
to issue temporary orders of protection before disposition 75 and
permanent orders in conjunction with final disposition.76
The extension of jurisdiction to the criminal court has made
available additional sanctions for violations of protection orders.
First, when a criminal court-issued protection order has been violated,
the court can revoke the offender's bail, probation or conditional
discharge. 77 Second, the court can punish the offender for contempt,
independent of the sanctions it may impose for the underlying
offense.78 Third, at least one court has held that criminal courts
adjudicating a case of intra-family assault have jurisdiction over a
secondary charge of contempt for violation of an existing family
court order of protection. 79
69. See id. §§ 847, 846 (McKinney 1983) (entitled "Petition; violation of court
order").
70. See id. § 846(d) (entitled "Issuance of warrant").
71. See id. § 846-a (sanctions for willful violation). If the court finds that
the violation was not willful it may still modify the petition for good cause
shown. See id. § 844 (McKinney 1983) (entitled "Reconsideration and modification").
72. See id § 847 (McKinney 1983).
73. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.11(2)(c) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 812(2)(c) (McKinney 1983).
74. Cf. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(10) (McKinney 1984) (sentence upon
conviction of original crime not reduced or diminished by punishment for contempt
based on violation of an order of protection).
75. See id. § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
76. See id. § 530.12(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
77. See id. § 530.12(11) (McKinney 1984).
78. See supra note 74; see also N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 750, 751 (McKinney 1975
& Supp. 1987) (power of courts to punish for criminal contempt).
79. See People v. Feist, 129 Misc. 2d 761, 762, 494 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (Dist.
Ct. Suffolk County 1985) (criminal court has jurisdiction over New York Penal
Law § 215.50(3) prosecution for contempt for violation of family court order of
protection); see also People v. Hayden, 129 Misc. 2d 444, 445-46, 493 N.Y.S.2d
272, 274 (Suffolk County Ct. 1985) (pursuant to New York Penal Law § 215.54
and New York Judiciary Law § 776, exclusive jurisdiction of court against which




Recent legislative efforts have focused primarily on expanding the
powers of the criminal court to issue protection orders ° and on
clarifying existing procedures for obtaining civil protection orders."1
The family court order of protection is the judicial remedy most
commonly sought by domestic violence victims. s2 In 1983, victims
filed 24,793 family offense petitions seeking protection orders in the
family courts.83
A number of commentators, however, have questioned the actual
over prosecution for like penal code violation). These courts, respectively, declined
to follow People v. Mosley, 121 Misc. 2d 4, 467 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Syracuse City
Ct. 1983) (no prosecution pursuant to New York Penal Law § 215.50 for violation
of family court order of protection), and criticized its holding. See Feist, 129 Misc.
2d at 762, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 629; Hayden, 129 Misc. 2d at 445, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
80. See, e.g., 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 620 (codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 530.12(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987)) (upon conviction of felony, criminal court may
enter order of protection effective up to five years beyond date of conviction or
three years from date of expiration of maximum term of indefinite sentence of
imprisonment actually imposed); 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 575 (codified at N.Y. CGRIM.
PROC. LAWS § 530.13 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)) (whenever there is a criminal
prosecution, criminal court is authorized to issue orders of protection as condition
of pre-trial release or release on bail to all crime victims regardless of their relation
to defendant); see also 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 376 (codified at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 155(1) (McKinney 1983)) (clarifying that arrest of respondent for violation of
family court protection order does not preclude petitioner from filing criminal
complaint instead of family court violation of protection order petition).
81. See, e.g., 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 391, § 1 (codified at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 818 (McKinney Supp. 1987)) (clarifying that family offense proceedings may
originate in family court venue where shelter in which victim has sought refuge
from violence is located); 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 847, §§ 1, 2 (codified, respectively,
at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987), and N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 530.11(6) (McKinney Supp. 1987)) (requiring police or law enforcement
officers investigating family offense to give victim notice of appropriate community
services, legal rights and available remedies); 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 693 (codified at
N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 262(a)(ii) (McKinney 1983)) (providing that indigent petitioners
have right to court appointed counsel in family court order of protection pro-
ceedings).
82. See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, reprinted
in 15 FoRDIAm URB. L.J. 11, 29-30 (1987) [hereinafter Women in the Courts].
"The victim of a family offense has two options when seeking court-ordered
protection .... The most widely used mechanism is a family court order of
protection .... Prosecutorial discretion to decline to prosecute [a] case limits the
availability of [criminal court issued orders of protection] .... 9' Id. (footnotes
omitted).
83. N.Y. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (citing NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, FAMILY COURT FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDINGS
(1983)).
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availability and efficacy of orders of protection."' One commentator
has observed that initial access to the courts is still problematic since
victims may not know "where to turn for help." 5 The Report of
the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts concluded that
some court personnel actively discourage victims who seek access to
either the family court or the criminal courts. 86 Victims may also
be disheartened by the length of time it can take to obtain the order
of protection." In addition, in 1982, the Governor's Commission on
Domestic Violence reported that prosecutors often found criminal
court judges reluctant to grant orders of protection. 8
The Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts
has criticized the family court's practice of frequently issuing mutual
orders of protection. 89 The Report found that mutual orders of
protection, especially in the absence of a cross-complaint, make the
petitioner appear equally guilty of violence and can negatively in-
fluence future court proceedings.9° Moreover, mutual orders often
confuse police, who, because they do not know which party to arrest,
sometimes arrest neither. 9'
84. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
85. Note, Restraining Order Legislation For Battered Women: A Reassessment,
16 U.S.F. L. REv. 703, 727 (1982) [hereinafter Restraining Order Legislation].
86. See Women in the Courts, supra note 82, at 34-36. The report, which was
commissioned by the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, was designed
to collect data in order to assist the Task Force in assessing the extent to which
gender bias may exist in the New York courts. See id. at 15, 23-25 & n.23. One
thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine attorneys responded to the survey which
included questions concerning such issues as equitable distribution, custody, rape
and domestic violence. See id. at 23 n.23. The Task Force reports that "[florty-
eight percent of women and thirty percent of men responding to the Attorneys'
Survey reported that women are 'sometimes' or 'often' discouraged from seeking
orders of protection in criminal court." Id. at 34 (footnote omitted). Furthermore,
35% of women and 24% of men who responded to the survey said that "domestic
violence victims are 'often' or 'sometimes' discouraged by court or probation
personnel from petitioning for orders of protection in family court." Id. at 35
(footnote omitted); cf. M. FIELDS & E. LEHMAN, HANDBOOK FOR BEATEN WOMEN
10 (1985) ("person at the appointment desk and the judge will both ask if this
was the first time your husband attacked you. If it was . . . they will try to get
you to forgive him").
87. See Fields, supra note 2, at 53 ("[jjudges in all courts also refuse to give
family violence cases the expedited hearings warranted in these emergency situations
.... Getting temporary orders of protection . . . can take months").
88. See TASK FORCE SECOND REPORT, supra note 28, at 25.
89. Women in the Courts, supra note 82, at 38. "[Mlany family court judges
routinely enter mutual orders of protection in family-offense proceedings upon the
mere oral request of respondents or sua sponte without prior notice to petitioners
and without an opportunity for rebuttal testimony by petitioners." Id.
90. See id. at 38-39.
91. See id. at 39.
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Commentators have cited inadequate enforcement as a factor that
diminishes the efficacy of protection orders. 92 It has been observed
that when a victim presents a copy of a protection order to a police
officer, thus authorizing him to arrest the violator,93 the officer is
often reluctant to make the arrest. 94 When a victim files a violation
of protection order petition with the family court, she " 'will prob-
ably wait at least six weeks to come before the judge.' "9 Even
then, sanctions for violations are at the discretion of the family
court judge. 96 Violators brought before either the family court or
even the criminal court are " 'likely to receive a light punishment,
if any at all.' -97 Finally, a study has suggested that orders of
protection do not significantly prevent future incidents of domestic
violence. 9
III. The Need for Mandatory Arrest Legislation
Three studies have similarly concluded that arrest of a batterer
reduces recidivism. 99 General police policy, however, which affords
officers discretion in making arrests, results in infrequent arrests of
persons committing acts of domestic violence.1° Conversely, man-
92. See id. at 44-45.
93. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 168(1) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 530.12(8) (McKinney 1984).
94. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 168 practice commentary 130, 131 (McKinney
1983) ("experience in many areas of the state seems to indicate [this provision's]
limited success in encouraging police responsiveness . . . the police still view many
family disputes as having minor importance and are reluctant to become involved").
95. Women in the Courts, supra note 82, at 44-45 (quoting testimony of Mary
Lee Sulkowski, former Director of Haven House, a battered women's shelter in
Buffalo, New York).
96. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 846-a (McKinney 1983) (entitled "Powers on
failure to obey order"); see also Women in the Courts, supra note 82, at 45
(" 'Family Court Act gives judges discretion regarding enforcement' ") (quoting
testimony of Wynn Gerhard, Esq., Acting Director of Neighborhood Legal Services
in Buffalo).
97. Women in the Courts, supra note 82, at 45 (quoting testimony of Elizabeth
Holtzman, District Attorney, Kings County); see also Fields, supra note 2, at 53 ("New
York Family Court judges rarely impose jail sentences for contempt for violating
orders of protection").'
98. See Restraining Order Legislation; supra note 85, at 732 (citing J. FAGAN,
E. FRIEDMAN, D. STEWART & V. LEWIS, THE NATIONAL FAMILY VIOLENCE EvAL-
UATION: FINAL REPORT (1982) (available at University of San Francisco Law Review
office). Approximately 60%o of the 89 former clients of Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration-funded family violence demonstration programs who had obtained
restraining orders suffered further abuse. One out of four was subjected to further
violence. See id. at 732 nn.160, 164.
99. See infra notes 102-24 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 127-75 and accompanying text.
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datory arrest legislation includes, among its advantages, the assurance
that batterers will be arrested. 101
A. Arrest Deters Future Incidents of Domestic Violence
Several recent studies conclude that arrest of a batterer is effective
in reducing recidivism. 10 2 In 1982, the Minneapolis Police Department,
in cooperation with the Police Foundation, conducted a "classic"
experiment. 103 The experiment was designed to test which police
response-advice, separation or arrest'4-most effectively deterred
abusers from repeating violence. 105 The experiment was conducted
over a one year period '06 in two Minneapolis precincts with the
highest density of reported domestic violence. 107 Based on follow-
up data supplied by the police and victims, 108 the researchers con-
cluded that of the three possible responses, arrest was the most
effective in preventing future acts of domestic violence.' 9 The find-
101. See infra notes 176-220 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
103. A "classic experiment" is a research design in which the effect of one
factor on another is determined by holding constant all other possible causes of
that effect. See Sherman & Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,
POLICE FOUND. REP. 3 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter Minneapolis Experiment]. For details of
the methodology, see Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest For
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261, 263-65 (1984) [hereinafter Sherman & Berk].
104. Police response was directed by lottery: each officer carried report-form
pads that were color-coded for each of the three possible responses. See Minneapolis
Experiment, supra note 103, at 3; see also Sherman & Berk, supra note 103, at
263. Whenever they received an appropriate domestic violence call they were to
respond in the manner directed by the form on the top of the pad. See id.
105. For ethical reasons, the experiment was confined to misdemeanor or simple
assault cases. See id. Pursuant to Minnesota statute the officer was not required
to witness the assault to make an arrest, but he was required to have probable cause to
believe that a cohabitant or spouse had assaulted the victim within the past four
hours. See id.
106. The experiment ran from March 17, 1981, to August 1, 1982, and produced
314 case reports. See Sherman & Berk, supra note 103, at 264; Minneapolis
Experiment, supra note 103, at 3-4.
107. See Minneapolis Experiment, supra note 103, at 3.
108. Two measures were used to determine rates of recidivism over a follow-up
period of six months: police records of repeat offenses; and interviews with 205
of the victims in which they were asked if there had been further violent incidents.
See id. at 5-6.
109. Results from police reports of subsequent violence show that out of the
314 initial reports, 24076 of the offenders who were "separated" and 19% of those
who received "advice" committed another violent act against a spouse within the
six-month period. Only 10% of the arrested offenders repeated their violence within
that period. See id. at 1 (figure 1).
Statistics computed from interviews with the 161 victims who completed all 12
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ings also indicated that concerns, voiced by both police and victims,
that arrest might lead to greater retributive violence against the
victim, were largely unjustified.110 In addition, the study suggested
that the deterrent effect of arrest does not seem to depend on
subsequent incarceration of the assailant; most of the batterers who
were arrested spent little, if any, time in jail."'
A second study, conducted in Santa Barbara County, California,
successfully replicated the findings of the Minneapolis experiment." 2
Researchers here also found that arrest reduced recidivism in domestic
violence incidents."' They concluded that there was no evidence that
follow-up interviews showed that of the suspects "separated" or "advised," 33%
and 37%, respectively, committed new acts of violence against their spouses, while
only 19% of those who had been arrested committed such acts. See id. at 6 (figure
2). Furthermore, interviews with victims indicate that according to them, the manner
of arrest may affect its deterrent effect. See id. at 6. When the police arrested
the suspect but did not take time to listen to the victim, 26% of the suspects
repeated their violent acts. When the police similarly arrested the suspect but also
talked with the victim, however, only nine percent of the suspects repeated an
offense. See id. (figure 3). One possible explanation for this finding is that when
the police acknowledged the victim, it showed the suspect that the victim had the
power to influence police actions and that he had not been arrested for arbitrary
reasons. See id. at 6.
110. See Sherman & Berk, supra note 103, at 270. Sherman and Berk concluded
that "arrest intervention certainly did not make things worse and may well have
made things better." Id. at 269.
111. See id. at 270. Of batterers who were arrested, 41Yo were released within
one day, 8607o within one week and 14% after a week. See id. at 268. These data
dispel the hypothesis that the violence-reducing effect of arrest was due only to
incapacitation. Moreover, the fact that the deterrent effect was not ostensibly
impaired by the absence of long jail terms undermines the rationale often given
by police for not arresting the offender-that without subsequent punishment arrest
is a "waste of time." See id. at 270. Arrest, by itself, seems to provide a deterrent
effect.
112. See Berk & Newton, Does Arrest Really Deter Wife Battery? An Effort to
Replicate the Findings of the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment, 50 AM. Soc.
REV. 253 (1985) [hereinafter Berk & Newton]. The data used was based on 783
wife battery incidents coming to police attention from June, 1981, to October,
1983, in Santa Barbara County, California. See id. at 256.
113. See id. at 261. Berk and Newton found that the deterrent effect of arrest
was strongest with those suspects who, the authors determined, were more likely
to be arrested anyway. See id. A number of factors or variables contributed .to
the "arrest propensity" of a suspect, including, but not limited to: whether the
suspect was difficult when police arrived; whether either party had been drinking;
the number of prior convictions; and the presence of a weapon. See id. at 257-
58. The authors propose three rival hypotheses to explain the greater deterrent
effect of arrest on "high propensity" batterers: (1) that for these batterers there
is also an increased probability of serious post-arrest sanctions; (2) that the manner
in which police arrest these offenders is more whole-hearted than in most domestic
violence cases, thus conveying the seriousness of the offense; or (3) that arrest
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"arrest increased the likelihood of new violence;' 1 4 that "on the
average, arrests deter wife batterers from committing new offenses;"' 1
and that these findings may thus support an argument for "at least
presumptory arrest." 1 16
The Minneapolis and Santa Barbara studies determined that once
police had intervened in a domestic dispute, arrest was the most
effective response in deterring future violence." 7 A third study,
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States
Department of Justice, in reliance on National Crime Survey data,
examined whether it is advisable for victims to call the police in
the first place." 8 Although data collected by the National Crime
Survey from 1978 to 1982 showed that the problem of repeat violence
is far greater for victims of domestic-related attacks than for victims
of an attack by a stranger, 1" 9 only sixteen percent of the women
who initially called'20 the police were victimized again within a six-
month period.' 2 ' Approximately twenty-three percent of women who
did not call, however, were subject to renewed violence. 22 In addition,
no evidence showed that any attacks that did occur after police
were called were more serious than the initial incidents or than
subsequent attacks experienced by victims who failed to call the
does not as strongly deter lower propensity batterers because the violent incidents
are rare for these individuals and are not recognized by them as battery. See id.
at 260-61.
114. Id. at 261 (empkasis in original).
115. Id.
116. Id. Because the research to date has not revealed the mechanisms underlying
the deterrent effect of arrest, Berk and Newton are reluctant to advocate adoption
of an arrest policy in the absence of further study. See id. at 261-62.
117. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
118. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 2 (Aug. 1986) [hereinafter PRE-
VENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE].
119. The National Crime Survey found that from 1978 to 1982 an estimated 2.1
million married, divorced and separated women were victims of domestic violence
at least once during an average twelve-month period. See id. at 3. Moreover, in
the six months following an initial victimization, 32% of the women were victimized
an average of three more times, whereas in stranger-to-stranger crimes for the same
period, only 13% of the victims were victimized again by a stranger. See id.
120. The authors classified about 1.8 million of the approximately 2.1 million
victims surveyed as "callers"-meaning that someone (most often the victim) called
the police during the first, and perhaps only, incident of domestic violence in the
twelve-month period-or "non-callers"-meaning that the police were not informed
of the incident. See id.
121. See id. at 4. Moreover, when the assailant and the victim were married-
not divorced or separated-the victim was 62% less likely to be assaulted again if she
had called the police. See id.
122. See id.
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police. 123 The Bureau of Justice statisticians concluded that the de-
terrent effect of calling the police may be attributable to the actual
arrests made. 24
Thus, the empirical evidence to date strongly supports the ar-
gument that law enforcement officers should intervene in incidents
of domestic violence. 25 Moreover, once police intervene, arrest of
the batterer is the most effective way of preventing repeated viol-
ence. 1
26
B. Discretionary Arrest Results in Non-Arrest in Domestic
Violence Cases
In practice, police generally use one of three approaches when
responding to domestic violence calls. They may: mediate; 127 rec-
123. See id.
124. Id. at 5. The authors observe:
The critical element may be what police actually do once they are called.
The arrests that undoubtedly occurred in some fraction of the incidents
recorded in the [National Crime Survey] may largely or even entirely
explain the lower risk of subsequent violence against women who call
the police.
Id. The authors also present two other hypotheses to account for the deterrent
effect: (1) that the mere threat of punishment presented by police intervention may
have a deterrent effect, see id., or (2) that calling the police is effective because
abused wives are "good judges of character" and thus know which abusers they
can safely report to the police. Id. at 4.
125. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
127. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 22-23 (September 1984) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
TASK FORCE]. The emphasis on a conflict-resolution approach in the 1960's led
various police departments, including the New York City Police Department, to
employ mediation intervention in response to domestic violence incidents. See
Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for
Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 85 (1983) [hereinafter Finesmith]. Until recently,
mediation was the preferred response in New York City, see id. (citing 10 CITY
OF NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T, LEGAL BUREAU BULL. (No. 5, July 11, 1980) (not
currently in effect)), but no longer. See infra note 172 for a discussion of the
New York City Police Department's current policy on domestic violence.
Police departments in a number of jurisdictions, however, still prefer mediation
over other responses. See Finesmith, supra, at 88-92.
The goal of mediation is often just "[q]uieting the people for the night and
preserving the peace." D. REED, S. FISCHER, G. CANTOR & K. KARALES, ALL THEY
CAN Do ... POLICE RESPONSE TO BATTERED WOMEN'S COMPLAINTS 51 (1983)[hereinafter ALL THEY CAN DO]. Mediation typically requires the officer to "calm
the dispute, listen carefully to both parties ... and suggest ways to resolve the
problem without involvement of the criminal justice system." RULE OF THUMB,
supra note 2, at 18.
Although traditionally preferred, mediation is often an inappropriate response to
the problem of domestic violence because: (1) it assumes equal culpability when
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ommend that the victim exercise her civil remedies; 12 or, as a last
resort, arrest the batterer.' 29 Although the current trend disfavors
mediation,'30 and some law enforcement organizations consider ar-
rest to be the "preferred response,"' 3 ' arrest is still discretionary
in New York State'32 and in most jurisdictions.' 33 Although New
York law implicitly authorizes police to make warrantless arrests in
cases of wife abuse, 34 police response to wife abuse still differs
from police response to other crimes.' 35 Police make fewer arrests
in spouse abuse incidents than in incidents of similar violence between
strangers. 3 6 Police may informally be implementing a higher standard
of probable cause in cases of wife abuse."'
that may not be the case; (2) it may be ineffective because of the disproportionate
allocation of power in the battering relationship; and (3) it may presume that the
underlying cause of violence can be resolved without arrest. See ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra at 22-23. Mediation is an inappropriate technique that
should not be used in lieu of arrest. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 18.
128. See id. at 20 (police try to steer victims to civil remedy in belief that
domestic violence does not belong in criminal justice system).
129. In its study of police attitudes towards domestic violence, the Civil Rights
Commission concluded that "police departments apply formal or tacit arrest-avoid-
ance policies to domestic violence cases." RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 21.
Moreover, police officers who testified at the commission hearings confirmed that
"arrests in domestic abuse cases are rare." Id. at 14.
130. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
131. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 127, at 17, 24
(recommending that chief executive of every law enforcement agency establish arrest
as "preferred" response to domestic violence).
132. See infra note 134.
133. See infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of state
laws making arrest of the batterer mandatory in certain circumstances, see infra
notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
134. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (McKinney 1981). This section
provides, inter alia, that "a police officer may arrest a person for ... [a] crime
when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such
crime, whether in his presence or otherwise." Id. (emphasis added). The term "crime"
includes both felonies and misdemeanors. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney
1975).
Statutes authorizing arrest implicitly apply to cases of wife abuse. See Woods,
Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7, 22 (Rutgers
Univ. 1978) [hereinafter Woods]. Moreover, in cases when the police may be reluctant
to arrest, a battered woman has the right to make a citizen's arrest. See id.; see,
e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1981). This law provides: "[Any
person may arrest another person (a) for a felony when the latter has in fact
committed such felony, and (b) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed
such offense in his presence." Id.
135. See supra note 9.
136. See id.
137. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 25 ("[p]olice often impose a higher standard
of probable cause to arrest in spouse abuse cases than [in] stranger cases"). In
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When the decision to arrest is discretionary, police rely on various
rationales to justify a tacit arrest-avoidance policy in spouse abuse
cases.' Police, influenced by their own attitudes about wife beat-
ing"' or the family, often conclude that arrest would violate marital
privacy,140 and would be economically detrimental to the family.14 '
Some police officers view arrest as futile, given complainant attrition 142
and prosecutorial inaction.' 3 They may believe that arresting the
instances of minor injuries, fewer arrests are made when there is a prior relationship
between the parties than when the parties are strangers. See id. at 25-26. Moreover,
police may minimize the severity of a battering incident. For example, one officer
observed: "This is mostly not very serious-maybe one of them gave the other a
few pops. If it's a legitimate battered woman where there's bleeding and all, it's
different." ALL THEY CAN DO, supra note 127, at 38. In the words of a victim:
"You have to be dead or almost dead for them [police] to take action. I've seen
this in almost all [New York City] boroughs-I've been in almost all boroughs
with him [the batterer] except Staten Island." Interview with domestic violence
victim, Urban Women's Shelter, Central Harlem, New York City (Feb. 13, 1987);
cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(4) (1981) ("[a] law enforcement officer at
the scene of an alleged incident of abuse shall use the same standard of enforcing
relevant Maine Criminal Code sections when the incident involves family or house-
hold members as when it involves strangers").
138. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
139. Some officers themselves may believe that the offender has a right to beat
his wife. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 207 (1979) ("[plolice officers
are frequently men who have been socialized to believe that a man has the right
to discipline his woman") [hereinafter WALKER]. One officer's anecdote about his
partner is illustrative:
I had a call and this guy was beating his wife up. My partner took me
outside and said, "[l]ook, son. I'm going to tell you something. I've
been married probably longer than how old you are." He said, "[m]y
wife feels as though I don't love her anymore, so at least once a month,
I start an argument, I slap her around a little bit, and we have a perfect
marriage. I've been married thirty-five years."
FLEMING, supra note 15, at 151. Walker reports that there is "[a]n unusually high
incidence of wife beating . . . among police officers." WALKER, supra, at 207.
140. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In a victim's words: "Each time
they [the police] came they said 'okay, be a good wife, you can fix it, why are
you trying to break up the family .... He'll just go find himself another wife.' "'
Interview with domestic violence victim, Urban Women's Shelter, Central Harlem,
New York City (Feb. 13, 1987).
141. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 1670; Note, The Inadequate Police Protection
of Battered Wives: Can a City and Its Police Be Held Liable Under the Equal
Protection Clause?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 435 (1986) [hereinafter Inadequate
Police Protection].
142. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 15. Witnesses testifying before the
Commisson on Civil Rights agreed: "[O]fficers do not always make arrests, even when
the victim specifically requests it, since many officers expect that the victim will
later change her mind." Id.
143. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 14-15; see also RULE OF THUMB, supra note
2, at 93 ("[plolice officers . . . may be less interested in arresting an assailant if
they know the prosecutor probably will not pursue the case").
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batterer would result in even greater danger to the victim-possibly
encouraging retaliation by the batterer.'" Practical constraints on
police resources, 45 and the low priority generally attached to domestic
violence calls,' 46 may further discourage arrest. Finally, because of
the common perception that domestic violence calls are among the
most dangerous for police, many officers may be reluctant to con-
front an already irate batterer with arrest. 4 7
None of these rationales, however, justifies a failure to arrest. 48
First, a decision to forgo arrest based on a perception that state
intervention would violate marital privacy and destroy the possibility
of harmony, is logically and legally indefensible: "The courts have
unequivocally ruled that the right of privacy shields acts between
two individuals only when both consent and when such acts do not
impair any person's safety and health.' ' 49 Second, the rationale that
arrest of the batterer would deprive the family of income does not
144. See Finesmith, supra note 127, at 85; Inadequate Police Protection, supra
note 141, at 435.
145. Factors such as the volume of violations at any given time can influence
the decision to arrest. See Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22"
Revisited, 3 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 138, 156 (Rutgers Univ. 1977) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Micklow].
146. Because batterers are not considered "serious criminals," as are "bank robbers
[and] murderers," police do not view arrest of a batterer as a "good pinch."
Blair, Making the Legal System Work for Battered Women, in BATTERED WOMEN
101, 107 (D. Moore ed. 1979). Arrest of a batterer is also not considered a
"glamorous job." Therefore, because domestic violence cases do not provide the
usual police rewards, they are a low priority for officers. See id.
147. Police officers commonly perceive intervention in domestic disturbances as
highly dangerous to themselves. See RuLE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 13. This
may lead them to "avoid domestic calls, to delay responding, or to avoid any
type of confrontational action when they do respond." GOOLKASIAN, supra note
4, at 6.
148. See infra notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
149. Marcus, supra note 4, at 1661 (footnotes omitted); see also People v. Liberta,
64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985). In holding unconstitutional the marital rape exemption provision of New
York Penal Law § 130, the New York Court of Appeals in Liberta rejected the
defendant's argument that the exemption protected marital privacy and promoted
reconciliation by preventing state intervention in marriage. The court found, instead,
that the exemption did not further privacy, because the right of privacy protects
consensual acts and not violent assaults. See id. at 165, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 214; cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The Court
in Trammel abolished spousal immunity, finding that "the modern justification for
this privilege"-its "perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the
marriage relationship"-was insufficient to sustain it. Id at 44. "When one spouse
is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding . . .their relationship
is ... in disrepair [and] there is probably little in the way of marital harmony
... to preserve." Id. at 52.
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justify the failure to arrest.'50 Police demonstrate no concern over
the effect of lost wages on the families of other criminals they
arrest.' Furthermore, alternative dispositions available to the courts
may enable batterers who have been arrested to continue working.5 2
Third, the possibility of complainant attrition is an invalid reason
for failure to arrest.'53 No evidence demonstrates that complainant
attrition is higher when the abuser and victim are married or co-
habitate, than when they are merely acquaintances.' 5 4 Existing com-
plainant attrition may be attributable to the systematic discouragement
that victims of domestic violence receive from the police, prosecutors
and the courts,'55 and thus may be remedied. 56 Moreover, com-
plainant attrition should not impair the deterrent effect of arrest,
since it has been shown that arrest alone, without further sanctions,
deters repeated violence.'57
Police rationalize their failure to arrest by pointing to the reluctance
of prosecutors to pursue domestic violence cases.5 I The officers may
thus view arrest as a waste of time or they may fear that if the
offender is free to immediately return home, arrest could trigger
retaliation against the victim. 5 9 While increased prosecutorial efforts
are badly needed,' ° failure to arrest based on potential failure to
prosecute, only perpetuates an unfortunate cycle of inaction.' 6' In
fact, more arrests may lead to more frequent prosecutions.' 62 Fur-
thermore, the empirical evidence shows that police fears that an
150. See Inadequate Police Protection, supra note 141, at 435.
151. See id. at 436; see also Marcus, supra note 4, at 1671 ("[b]urglars and
batterers may not use diminution of their family's income as a basis for immunity
if their victims are strangers; it would be a curious paradox if economic protection
of the wife were invoked only where her own loss of physical security is at stake")
(footnote omitted).
152. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
153. See Woods, supra note 134, at 19-20.
154. See Inadequate Police Protection, supra note 141, at 436.
155. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
156. In states where prosecutors have vigorously pursued domestic violence cases,
the incidences of cooperation by complaining witnesses, and the rates of conviction,
have been high. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 1680, 1690 n.140. For a discussion
of enhanced prosecution programs and victim advocacy projects, see infra notes
305-15 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 10; infra note 200.
161. If police make fewer arrests because of perceived prosecutorial inaction,
fewer batterers will be subject to prosecution-thus cyclically reinforcing police
perceptions.
162. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 119-20 ("[an increase in the number of
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arrested batterer will retaliate against the victim are, for the most
part, unfounded. 163
Police policy, which generally gives low priority to domestic viol-
ence, is generated by a perception of domestic violence as essentially
non-criminal. 164 This perception is false: acts of domestic violence
are often undeniably criminal; 65 they are often accompanied by
serious injury to the victim 166 and are characterized by high rates
of recidivism. 6
7
Finally, police concerns that domestic violence incidents dispro-
portionately threaten their own safety are largely unfounded. 68 A
recent study has shown that in New York City, domestic violence
calls accounted for only two percent of all assaults on officers. 69
Moreover, compared with four other types of incidents to which
police respond-robbery, burglary, traffic and other disturbances-
domestic violence presented one of the lowest risks of injury. 70
Even though much of the rationale for non-arrest is without merit,
it still influences the perceptions of officers who make the ultimate
decision of whether to arrest.' 7 1 In New York, the absence of any
statutory control over police discretion 72 in responding to the unique
persons arrested for violence against their mates ... will lead to more frequent
prosecution of family violence cases").
163. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 146.
165. See supra note 4.
166. See id.
167. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
168. See GOOLKASLAN, supra note 4, at 6. Misinterpretation of official statistics
on police deaths has contributed to the perception that domestic violence calls are
highly dangerous. The danger of responding to domestic violence calls has been
exaggerated because statistics regarding domestic violence calls were included with
other categories:
Until 1982, all felonious deaths of police officers which occurred when
they responded to bar fights, "man with a gun" situations, general
disturbances, and "family quarrels" were reported by the FBI under the
category of "disturbances," and for a number of years this category
was the single most frequent category of officer deaths.
Id. According to the National Association of Chiefs of Police, confrontations with
"criminals" are now considered more dangerous than responding to domestic
violence calls: "Robbery and burglary calls have displaced domestic disputes as the
most dangerous calls for law enforcement officials." USA Today, Jan. 6, 1987,
at 8A, col. 1.
169. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 4, at 6 (citing J. GARNER & E. CLEMER, DANGER
TO THE POLICE FROM DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE CALLS: A NEW LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE
(National. Institute of Justice 1985)).
170. See id.
171. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
172. Any limiting of police discretion has come from the courts and the threat
of civil liability. In Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d
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problem of wife abuse has resulted in a lack of uniformity on two
levels-in the actions of individual officers and in police policy
70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), the court held New York City liable for its failure
to provide reasonable police protection to six-year old Dina Sorichetti, to whom
a special duty was owed. See id. at 470-71, 482 N.E.2d at 76-77, 492 N.Y.S.2d
at 597-98. The facts of Sorichetti are tragic. Mrs. Sorichetti, Dina's mother, had
repeatedly obtained orders of protection against her violent husband. During the
exercise of his weekly visitation privileges with Dina, however, Mr. Sorichetti viciously
attacked the girl with a knife, a fork, and a screwdriver, and tried to saw off her leg,
leaving her permanently injured. See id. at 464-67, 482 N.E.2d at 72-74, 492 N.Y.S.2d
at 593-95. The court held that the police owed Dina a special duty arising from:
(1) the existence of a protection order obtained by Dina's mother, against her
husband; (2) police awareness of Mr. Sorichetti's potential for violence; (3)
Mrs. Sorichetti's reasonable expectation of police protection; and (4) police re-
ponse to Mrs. Sorichetti's requests for assistance on the day of the assault. See
id. at 469, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596; see also Bloom v. City of
New York, 78 Misc. 2d 1077, 357 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974)
(municipality liable for negligent failure to protect when its officers have given
specific assurance of protection). Liability for failure to protect, however, may be
limited in New York to cases in which the court finds that the police owed a
special duty to the victim. Cf. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d
860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (no liability when police had not undertaken to
protect).
Prior to Sorichetti, 12 battered wives had used the New York courts to challenge
the New York City Police Department, among other parties, for its policy of non-
arrest and its resulting failure to protect the wives from their abusive husbands.
See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. N.Y: County
1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1978) (non-justiciable
cause of action), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
The trial court, refusing to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
had held that the police owed a duty of protection to women who had obtained
orders of protection. See Bruno, 90 Misc. 2d at 1050, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
Before the appeal, the police entered into a court-enforceable consent judgment
with the plaintiffs, see Woods, supra note 134, at 27, which resulted in amendments
to the New York City Police Department's regulations concerning response to
domestic violence incidents. See id. Current New York City Police Department
guidelines expand the definition of "family/household" beyond the Family Court
Act definition, to include " 'common-law' marriages, and same sex couples."
CITY OF NEW YORK POLIcE DEP'T INTERIM ORDER No. 56, 2 (Aug. 1, 1985)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). The current regulations also
limit police discretion: arrest is required, even against the wishes of the victim,
if the officer has probable cause to believe a felony has been committed. See id.
at 3. If the police officer has probable cause to believe that the offender committed
a misdemeanor, the officer must make an arrest if the victim requests, and he
may do so at his discretion, even if she objects. See id. The guidelines stress that
the standard of probable cause applied in domestic violence situations does not
differ from the standard applied in situations involving other offenses. See id. at
2.
In addition, the New York City Police Department now prohibits an officer
from issuing a Desk Appearance Ticket when the victim and the offender are
members of the same "family/household" and, the "[o]ffender has violated an
[ojrder of [pirotection [or when the] [oiffense charged is disorderly conduct, harassment,
menacing, reckless endangerment 2 [degree]; assault 3 [degree] or attempted assault, [or
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across the state.'73 Moreover, the policy of discretionary arrest in
New York, where "[a] major systemic problem has been inadequate
police responses to domestic violence calls,"' 7 4 leads, more often
than not, to no arrest.'75
the] ...victim requests [the] opportunity to obtain a [tlemporary [o]rder of [plrotec-
tion, [or the] facts of the case indicate the immediate need of a [t]emporary [o]rder
of [p]rotection." Id. at 6.
Recently, the police department has intensified its efforts to combat domestic
violence in New York City. In October, 1984, the New York City Police Department,
in conjunction with the Victim Services Agency (VSA), established the Domestic
Violence Prevention Program (DVPP). See CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T
OPERATIONS ORDER No. 47, 1 (May 9, 1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office) [hereinafter OPERATIONS ORDER No. 47]. The DVPP, which currently
operates in three New York City precincts, employs a team consisting of a police
officer and a VSA counselor "to track and target violent households and to
administer outreach intervention strategies." DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION PRO-
GRAM, POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK 1 (undated and unpublished) (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVEN-
TION PROGRAM].
Accordingly, a fulltime "Domestic Violence Prevention Officer" (DVPO), assigned
to each of the three precincts, reviews records of past and present domestic violence
calls to the precinct. See OPERATIONS ORDER No. 47, supra, at 1. The DVPO then
compiles a list of addresses at which serious or numerous domestic disputes have
occurred, including information on arrest activity and the presence of weapons,
for dissemination to officers of the command. See id. The DVPO also telephones
targeted households to explain to either the batterer or the victim that domestic
violence is a crime and that the situation in his/her household will be monitored
by the police. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM, supra, at 2. Victims
are offered the assistance of a VSA counselor, and are informed of their options,
including orders of protection and/or arrest and prosecution of the batterer. See
id. Batterers are informed of the availability of counseling. See id. In certain cases,
the DVPO is authorized to make personal visits to affected households, arrest
batterers, or assist complainants in serving summonses and protection orders. See
OPERATIONS ORDER No. 47, supra, at 1.
The DVPP is not limited to the participation of a VSA counselor and a DVPO,
but also extends to the prosecutorial level. The District Attorney's office has agreed
to prosecute misdemeanor domestic violence cases in the absence of a complainant
"if the police can provide an independently supportable case." DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PREVENTION PROGRAM, supra, at 3.
Victims in other states have also used the courts' coercive powers to effect police
reform. For example, in Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
Conn. 1984), the court upheld an equal protection challenge to malperformance
of official police duties with regard to assaults on the plaintiff by her husband.
See id. at 1527. Moreover, the Thurman case inspired the Connecticut State Leg-
islature to enact comprehensive state-wide domestic violence legislation, which in-
cludes a mandatory arrest provision. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
173. For example, the police department in one town in Rockland County, New
York, has a "preferred arrest" policy, while the police departments in 12 other
Rockland County towns do not. Telephone interview with Phyllis B. Frank, President
of the New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence (Feb. 2, 1987) [here-
inafter Frank Interview].
174. N.Y. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
175. A commentator familiar with the problem of domestic violence in New
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C. Benefits of Mandatory Arrest
If the basic goals of criminal law are "standard-setting, deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and punishment, 1' 76 then mandatory
arrest for acts of domestic violence serves these goals well. 7 7 Sta-
tutorily mandated arrest makes explicit the legislative intent to in-
crease arrests in instances of domestic violence.'78 It makes clear the
oft-forgotten fact that spouse abuse is a crime, 79 and it communicates
that fact to the community, 80 to the police,' to the batterer 82 and
to the victim." 3 Mandatory arrest will help ensure that police decisions
are not predicated on erroneous and archaic rationales.1 4 Changing
the current policy of discretionary arrest to a policy of mandatory
arrest will compel police to do their jobs and more arrests will be
made. 85
Systematic arrest of batterers may have a manifold impact. Cer-
tainty of punishment is a critical element of deterrence. 8 6 Logically,
York observed that in Otsego County: "County police, sheriffs, and state troopers
all [handle] domestic violence calls, and arrest is a last resort-definitely not a
first choice." Telephone interview with Regina Haran-Buckner, Assistant Director
of Aid to Battered Women, Oneonta, New York (Feb. 2, 1987). Moreover, Phyllis
B. Frank, President of the New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
observed that "according to feedback [she] received in traveling across the state,
arrest is [not the usual] response, [and] even in cases where [arrest] guidelines
exist-arrest is not the typical response." Frank Interview, supra note 173.
176. Finesmith, supra note 127, at 104.
177. See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text.
178. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 130.
179. See supra notes 8, 127-37 and accompanying text.
180. See MARTIN, supra note 2, at 174 ("legislation very often effects changes
in public attitudes over time").
181. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
182. Sanctions demonstrate social disapproval of various behaviors, and with-
holding sanctions demonstrates to batterers that their behavior is not illegal. See
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 3, at 217.
183. An arrest of the perpetrator of violence can demonstate to the victim that
she has a right not to be beaten. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 120-21. A victim's
comment supports this proposition:
When I was battered my ex-husband told me it was my fault. The police
acted as if it was my fault. No one ever said it was his fault; no one
ever said he was breaking the law. No one ever acted as if it was him
and not me who should have been punished.
An Act Concerning Family Violence Prevention and Response: Public Hearings
Before Connecticut General Assembly, Joint Standing Comm. on the Judiciary,
Part 2, 522 (1986) (testimony of Tracy Thurman) [hereinafter Hearings]. For a
discussion of the Thurman case, which was, in part, the impetus for legislative
reform in Connecticut, see supra note 172.
184. See supra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
186. Marcus, supra note 4, at 1686. "Certainty of punishment is critical to its
impact." Id. Moreover, "[tihe prime penological goal of deterrence is premised
on such certainty." Id. at 1686 n.124.
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therefore, limiting police discretion will make the threat and reality
of punishment more immediate to the batterer. Mandatory arrest
may thus provide a deterrent effect, I8 7 both general'8 and specific.8 9
It has a general deterrent effect because many batterers do not view
their behavior as criminal,' 90 and therefore an awareness that their
acts will result in arrest can be a powerful deterrent. 9' Furthermore,
studies' 92 indicate that arrest in instances of wife abuse has a specific
deterrent effect: batterers who were arrested showed reduced rates
of recidivism upon their return home.' 93 The deterrent effects of
sanctions against an abuser may potentially be greater than they are
for other crimes.'9 Generally, an offender's belief that he will elude
identification and not be apprehended, diminishes the deterrent effect
of sanctions. 95 Domestic violence, however, is one of the few crimes
in which the offender knows the victim can always identify him. 96
While arrest itself-without further sanctions-deters, 197 increased
arrests may also lead to more frequent prosecution of offenders. 98
187. See id. at 1685. "Assaults have been punishable as crimes throughout our
history . .. because persuasion and supervision are insufficient without the ultimate
sanction of incarceration." Id.
188. A "general deterrent" dissuades potential offenders in the general community
from committing criminal acts. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSON,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 195 (1983).
189. A "specific deterrent" entails inflicting a sanction upon a particular indi-
vidual so he is less likely to engage in a certain act again. See id.
190. Typically, batterers "are likely to see themselves as law-abiding citizens for
whom arrest is unusual and frightening." Finesmith, supra note 127, at 104.
191. The realistic consequences of arrest-"publicity, embarrassment, and loss
of time from work," id., as well as the "symbolic impact [accompanying] the
stigma attached to criminal misconduct," LERMAN, supra note 3, at 14, may have
a strong deterrent effect. See Finesmith, supra note 127, at 104. In the words of
a former batterer: " 'It was such an extreme experience having actually been arrested
and dealt with rather harshly ... that I sought help.' " ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE, supra note 127, at 22 (quoting former abuser).
192. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text. The authors of the Min-
neapolis experiment, which was confined to a study of misdemeanor assault cases,
"favor a presumption of arrest .. . [and] do not ... favor requiring arrests in
all misdemeanor domestic assault cases." Sherman & Berk, supra note 103, at 270
(emphasis in original). The authors of the Santa Barbara study note that the deter-
rent effects of arrest found under existing conditions may be altered if those condi-
tions are changed, for example, by the adoption of an arrest policy. See Berk &
Newton, supra note 112, at 261.
193. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
194. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 127, at 4-5.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
198. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 119-20. Prosecution need not always result
in incarceration of the batterer. Prosecution, or the threat of prosecution, also can
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Indeed, increased prosecutions may be encouraged simply by the
sheer volume of arrests.' 99 A legislative scheme that provides for
enhanced prosecutorial efforts200 can also lead to more frequent and
successful prosecutions. 20 1
The implications of statutorily mandated arrest will vary depending
upon the circumstances of the individual victim.21 2 For all victims,
however, arrest of the batterer can prevent further immediate in-
jury.203 For those women who, in the past, had called the police in
an unsuccessful attempt to have the batterer arrested, mandatory
arrest will be a welcome validation of the seriousness of their plight.
204
provide the leverage necessary to order a batterer into a rehabilitative counseling
program. See id. at 91. For a discussion of pretrial and posttrial diversion, see infra
notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
199. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 119-20.
200. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273.82, 273.83 (West Supp. 1987) (limiting
discretion not to charge and implementing vertical prosecution program to increase
likelihood of convicting batterers).
In general, prosecutors have broad discretion to charge. See Dixon v. District
of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see also Eisenberg & Micklow,
supra note 145, at 158 ("common knowledge that a prosecuting attorney exercises
considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to invoke the criminal process
in any given case"). But see Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 680 n.19 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (" 'prosecutorial discretion' " not a "magical incantation").
Prosecutors, however, sometimes hesitate to prosecute wife battering cases. The
goal of securing convictions can make prosecution of spouse abuse a "poor risk" for
prosecutors, RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 23-24, because of the possibility
that victims will be hesitant to file complaints or to testify. See LERMAN, supra
note 3, at 18-19. Nevertheless, prosecutors who sometimes discourage victims or
delay trials contribute to the problem of complainant attrition. See id. at 20. This
self-perpetuating cycle can be reversed by impressing upon prosecutors their re-
sponsibility to expedite serious cases through the criminal justice system, and to
provide for victim support programs. See Fromson, Report of the NDAA/CWPS
Memphis, Tennessee, Meeting, Sept. 25-28, 1978, in LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE
CASES 11-12 (1980).
Prosecutors can increase victim cooperation by treating spouse abuse as a crime
against the state. By acknowledging that it is their duty-not the victim's-to
enforce the law, prosecutors can reduce the pressure on the victim and thus encourage
cooperation. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 34.
201. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 35 ("[d]omestic violence prosecution units have
not only reduced case attrition, but have also obtained a high rate of convictions").
For a discussion of programs for enhanced prosecution of spouse abuse, see infra
notes 301-11 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
203. Police are called most often during the "acute battering phase," which can
last from two to 24 hours. LERMAN, supra note 3, at 120. Thus, police who arrive
and then immediately depart may leave the victim in grave danger, even if both
parties appear calm. See id.
204. See supra note 183.
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The effect of a mandatory arrest statute on the victim who does
not call the police, 05 will depend on the reasons for her failure to
call. If she avoided calling because, through past experience, she
thought it would be ineffective, 20 6 then an awareness that arrest is
mandatory may encourage her to call. If she has never called, her
failure to do so may be attributable to the confluence of factors
that keeps her in an abusive relationship. 0 7 For this victim a man-
datory arrest policy may have little impact, other than to convey
to her social and legislative disapproval of the batterer's actions. 20 8
Arguments can be made against requiring arrest when the victim
has called the police but does not want the batterer arrested. 2 9
Nevertheless, several considerations override the argument that man-
datory arrest is undesirable because it supersedes a victim's choice. 210
First, assuming, arguendo, that a victim's desire not to have the
205. A study of 201 female victims of spouse abuse attempted to identify the
factors that influence a victim's decision to call the police. See Berk, Berk, Newton
& Loseke, Cops on Call: Summoning the Police to the Scene of Spousal Violence,
18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 479 (1984) [hereinafter Berk, Berk, Newton & Loseke]. The
authors concluded that "victims will be very likely to call the police if they have
called the police in the past, if witnesses are present, if they are not married to
the offender, if the offender is poorly educated, and if he has a violent history."
Id. at 493. Moreover, neither the race or employment status of a batterer, nor
the severity of the victim's injury, seemed to discernably affect a decision to call
for police help. See id. at 492-93.
206. Victims participating in a Cook County, Chicago, study gave as a reason
for not calling the police the fact that they thought "it would do no good," that
the police " 'were very cordial and courteous, but they did nothing.' " ALL THEY
CAN DO, supra note 127, at 29-30.
207. Experts have associated certain personality traits and psychological char-
acteristics with battered women, including: low self-esteem, guilt, emotional de-
pendence, isolation, fear, ambivalence and shame. See FLEMING, supra note 15, at
81-93. Battered women may have traditional views about home, family and prescribed
female roles. See WALKER, supra note 139, -at 31, 36.
The psychological profile of a battered woman, however, is beyond the scope of
this Note. Moreover, discussion of generic characteristics of "the battered woman"
has been omitted deliberately, as it can lead to "blaming the victim." Victim blam-
ing obscures the fact that, regardless of the reasons for a woman's victimization, the
acts perpetrated against her are crimes. See generally DULUTH, MINNESOTA DOMESTIC
ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, THE JUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC ASSAULT
CASES 2-7 (undated and unpublished) (available from Minnesota Program Develop-
ment, Inc., Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, 206 West Fourth Street, Duluth,
Minn. 55806) [hereinafter DULUTH ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT].
208. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 210, 217 and accompanying text.
210. See Note, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or
Alternative, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 243, 260 (1985) (a "problem with an arrest policy




batterer arrested is a form of acquiesence to the assault, it is still
an indisputable proposition that "there is no legally valid permission
to inflict serious physical injury on a consenting victim." 21 Permitting
the victim of domestic assault to prevent the arrest of the batterer
would, in essence, be giving legal effect to a victim's consent to a
crime committed against her. Second, domestic assault is a crime
against the state, 212 as well as against the individual. Therefore,
because "a private individual generally has no authority to settle or
condone such a public wrong, even if [she] is the victim of it,"213
it is reasonable to preclude a battered wife's preference for non-
arrest .214
Finally, the argument that arrest should be the victim's choice
fails to take into account the possibility that she may not have made
a free choice in the first place. She may not request arrest in the
presence of the batterer out of fear that if she initiates the criminal
action, he will retaliate against her. 215 Mandatory arrest, however,
not only relieves the victim of the burden of being the one to request
arrest in front of her abusive husband, but may also, as a result,
reduce his animosity towards her. 21 6
211. Marcus, supra note 4, at 1678.
212. See id. at 1678-79 n.86 ("[ajlthough the crime of assault is conveniently
classified as an offense 'against the person,' this is merely a convenient shorthand
for 'an offense against the State in the form of injury to the person' "); ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 127, at 12. "Assaults against family members
are not only crimes against the individual but also crimes against the state and the
community." Id.
213. Marcus, supra note 4, at 1678-79 n.86 (citing R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
975 (2d ed. 1969)).
214. Cf. GOOLKASIAN, supra note 4, at 62 (need to protect innocent bystanders
and community from future domestic violence supports argument for eliminating
victim influence on prosecution decisions); see also People v. Harris, 113 Misc. 2d
46, 54, 448 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (Suffolk County Ct. 1982) (unlawful possession of
loaded revolver not within family court jurisdiction-"[ilt is inconceivable that the
[I]egislature intended to vest in the complaining spouse the power of determining
• . .whether or not to prosecute criminally those criminal acts which are of danger,
not only to the complaining spouse, but to the other members of the public").
215. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 4, at 35 ("[u]nderstandably, battered women
often fear that being an active party in an arrest will bring increased retaliation
and violence when the offender is released").
216. See An Act Concerning Family Violence Prevention and Response: Con-
necticut General Assembly House of Representatives Proceedings, Vol. 29, Part
14, 5267 (1986) (testimony of Representative Migliaro). Mandatory arrest allows
"the arresting officer [to make] a decision without any written complaint from the
individual who has been hurt; therefore, taking the burden of arrest away from
that individual and the person that is arrested can no more go back and blame
that person, particularly the spouse." Id. Moreover, it may be appropriate to make
a decision for the victim, because a battered woman who has called the police in
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Critics of mandatory arrest also argue that if victims who do not
want the abuser arrested are aware of the policy, they will be reluctant
to call the police. 27 It is possible that fewer calls will be made.2 11
Nonetheless, effective police assistance to victims who do call is
arguably more desirable than providing ineffective assistance to a
greater number of victims.3 9 Moreover, even if a mandatory arrest
statute discourages some victims from calling the police, it would
be unlikely to deter bystanders, whose calls to police have been
shown to be equal in number to calls by victims.2 0
Ultimately, the benefits of mandatory arrest-deterrence, increased
prosecution, setting a standard of acceptable behavior, and prevention
of immediate injury-strongly outweigh the cost of limiting the
victim's choice. 221
IV. Models of Reform for New York
A number of states have responded to the problem of domestic
violence by enacting statutes which provide precise guidelines for
law enforcement response to domestic violence, including permissive
or mandatory arrest provisions.2 2 2
A. Permissive Arrest Provisions
Subject only to the fourth amendment of the United States Con-
the middle of a violent episode is unlikely to be capable of making a major decision
such as requesting an arrest. See ALL THEY CAN Do, supra note 127, at 63.
217. See Immediate Arrest, supra note 210, at 259.
218. One study shows a decrease in domestic violence related runs by police in
Michigan following implementation of legislation expanding police authority to
arrest for domestic assault. See Buzawa, Police Officer Response to Domestic
Violence Legislation in Michigan, 10 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 415, 423 (1982).
The author, after dismissing two rival hypotheses-a decrease in domestic violence
or greater initial screening by police of calls-posited that police made fewer runs
because they received fewer calls. See id. Buzawa's tentative hypothesis was that
as victims became aware of increased police arrest powers, they were reluctant to
call for fear of adverse consequences. See id. The author concluded, however, by
noting the dilemma presented by these findings-whether to opt for a policy that
results in "a large number of relatively ineffective police-citizen interactions" or
to adhere to an expanded arrest policy that apparently results in "a smaller number
of contacts with a higher possibility of success." Id.
219. See id.
220. See Berk, Berk, Newton & Loseke, supra note 205, at 485. In their study
of 201 victims of domestic violence, the authors discovered that approximately one-
half of the 110 calls to the police were made by bystanders, including neighbors,
children, relatives, friends and landlords. See id.
221. See supra notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 223-55 and accompanying text.
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stitution's requirement of probable cause,223 states may freely grant
the authority to arrest.22 ' A number of states recently have enacted
legislation specifically expanding the power of police to make war-
rantless arrests in instances of spouse abuse. 225 Some states have
amended the language of their existing warrantless arrest provisions
to include explicit authorization to arrest in instances of domestic
violence. 226
223. The fourth amendment requires that for an arrest to be constitutionally
valid:
[Police] officers [must have] probable cause to make it-[there must be]
at that moment [of arrest] ... facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [that
are) sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect]
ha[s] committed or was committing an offense.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
224. Lerman, Expansion of Police Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Interven-
tion, 3 RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMiLY 1, 2 (June, 1980) [hereinafter Police
Arrest Power].
225. See infra notes 226-43 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's decision
in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), should not render these provisions
unconstitutional. See Police Arrest Power, supra note 224, at 2. Although the Court
in Payton circumscribed police power to make warrantless arrests in the homes of
suspects, this does not appear to apply to instances of domestic violence. First,
the two warrantless arrests invalidated by Payton involved "entries into homes
made without the consent of any occupant." Id. at 583. In domestic violence cases,
however, the victim usually consents to the entry of the police. Warrantless arrests
in these cases therefore are not within the ambit of Payton's prohibition. Cf.
United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1984) (warrantless arrest
upheld because mother and sister of suspect voluntarily admitted police into home
and entry into home with " 'consent of one who possesses common authority over
the premises ... is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom
the authority is shared' ") (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415, U.S. 164, 170
(1974)).
Second, Justice Stevens' caveat in Payton further indicates the inapplicability of
the holding to instances of domestic violence: "[W]e have no occasion to consider
the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent
circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." 445 U.S. at 583. The factors used to determine the
presence of exigent circumstances include:
"(1) [T]he gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect
is to be charged; . . .[2] 'a clear showing of probable cause ... to believe
that the suspect committed the crime'; [and (3)] 'strong reason to believe
that the suspect is in the premises being entered' .. ."
United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d. Cir.) (quoting Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978)). Thus,
undoubtedly, most instances of domestic violence fall under the rubric of "exigent
circumstances" to which the Payton decision does not apply.
226. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(b) (Supp. 1986) (warrantless arrest
permitted when victim is spouse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15(6), (7)(a) (West 1985
& Supp. 1986) (warrantless arrest upon probable cause for violation of domestic
violence protective injunction; battery upon person's spouse with evidence of bodily
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Other states have enacted separate domestic violence prevention
statutes that specify the way in which law enforcement officials must
respond to domestic violence. 227 A greater responsiveness to the
victim's needs is implicit in many of these provisions, which may
require, or permit, police to: (1) notify the victim of her legal rights
and of available social services; 221 (2) assist her in obtaining medical
treatment; 229 (3) remain on the scene until the immediate danger has
harm or potential for further violence); IDAHO CODE § 19-603(6) (Supp. 1987)
(warrantless arrest if reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evidence or
statements made in officer's presence, that person has assaulted spouse); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 46-6-401(2) (1985) (warrantless arrest upon probable cause for domestic
abuse or aggravated assault against family or household member); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Anderson 1987) (in pursuit outside jurisdiction, police officer
may arrest and detain person who officer has reasonable cause to believe has
committed offense of domestic violence, until warrant obtained).
227. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.3601 to -.3602 (Supp. 1986) (entitled
"Ch. 36 Family Offenses"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700-13731 (West Supp. 1987)
(entitled "Law Enforcement Response to Domestic Violence"); CoLo. REV. STAT.
H§ 14-4-101 to -105 (Supp. 1984) (entitled "Domestic Abuse"); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 709-906 (1985) (entitled "Abuse of family and household members; penalty");
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-1 to 2313-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (entitled
"Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986"); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 209A, §§ 1-9
(Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1987) (entitled "Abuse Prevention"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-1 to -:25-16 (West 1982) (entitled "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 40-40.6 (West Supp. 1987) (entitled "Victim of ...
Domestic Abuse"); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-15-1 to -7 (Supp. 1986) (entitled "Domestic
Abuse Prevention"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-1109 (Supp. 1986) (entitled
"Abuse Prevention").
228. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520 (1986) (must provide to victims in-
formation regarding shelters and obtaining court orders); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.3601(d) (Supp. 1986) (police must inform victims of availability of protection
orders and emergency social services); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701 (West Supp. 1987)
(police departments shall develop guidelines for responding to domestic violence,
including provisions for informing victim of available criminal procedures and social
services); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.29, 415.606 (West 1986) (police must notify
victim of location of nearest domestic violence center and of right to file criminal
complaint); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2313-4(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
(when no arrest made, police must inform victim of right to request criminal
proceedings); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (police
must inform victim of legal options); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-7 (West 1982)
(police must notify victim of legal rights and available social services); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 40.2 (West Supp. 1987) (peace officer must give victim notice of
available social services and of right to prosecute assailant); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
15-5 (Supp. 1986) (police must notify victim of legal remedies).
229. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2313-4(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987) (police may provide victim with transportation to hospital or shelter); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (police may assist victim in
obtaining medical treatment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5 (Supp. 1986) (police may
assist victim in obtaining medical services).
[Vol. XV1034
PROTECTING BATTERED WOMEN
passed; 230 or (4) protect the victim as she prepares to leave the
home.2 1' Moreover, legislators have recognized the criminal nature
of many acts of domestic violence by including express statutory
guidelines for permissive arrest when the police have probable cause
to believe a person has violated an order of protection or committed
a crime against his spouse when no such order exists. 23 2 By enacting
legislation that specifically addresses law enforcement response to
spouse abuse, these states have acknowledged past deficiencies in
police response. 233 Moreover, recent enactments demonstrate an
awareness on the part of legislators, that to compensate for past
230. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)
(police must remain until immediate danger passes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5
(Supp. 1986) (police may be required to remain with victim until no immediate
danger).
Alternatively, some statutes authorize the police to order the abuser to leave the
premises for a "cooling-off" period. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(3)
(1985) (12 hour cooling-off period).
231. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2313-4(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
(police may accompany victim removing possessions from home).
232. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601(B), -3602(I) (Supp. 1986)
(warrantless arrest upon probable cause for violation of protection order or com-
mission of misdemeanor or felony domestic violence); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 709-
906(2), -906(3) (1985) (warrantless arrest upon reasonable grounds to believe person
has physically abused household member, and that arrested person is, in fact,
guilty); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2313-1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (warrantless
arrest upon probable cause for crime, including but not limited to, protection order
violation); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (warrantless
arrest upon probable cause for felony, or for misdemeanor committed in officer's
presence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-5 (West 1982) (warrantless arrest upon probable
cause for protection order violation, act of "domestic violence," or apparent injury
to victim); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3B (West Supp. 1987) (warrantless arrest
upon probable cause for act of "domestic abuse" committed within preceding four
hours causing visible injury to victim); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5 (Supp. 1986) (war-
rantless arrest upon probable cause for felony domestic violence, or misdemeanor
when failure to arrest could result in nonapprehension or further injury).
233. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-2 (West 1982) (entitled "Legislative
Findings and Declarations").
The Legislature . . . finds ... that even though many of the existing
criminal statutes are applicable to acts of domestic violence, previous
societal attitudes concerning domestic violence have affected the response
of our law enforcement and judicial systems, resulting in these acts
receiving different treatment from similar crimes when they occur in a
domestic context .... [B]attered adults presently experience substantial
difficulty in gaining access to protection from the judicial system ....
[Thus] . . . the primary duty of a law enforcement officer when respond-
ing to a domestic violence call is to enforce the laws allegedly violated
and to protect the victim.
10351987]
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inadequacies, all levels of the legal system-the legislature, the courts
and the police-must address the problem of domestic violence.
234
B. Mandatory Arrest Laws
Several states have done more than merely codify existing dis-
cretionary arrest practices to eradicate the traditional misuse of
discretion in domestic violence cases.2 35 These states have enacted
domestic violence prevention statutes that make arrest of an offender
mandatory in certain circumstances. 236 Domestic abuse statutes in
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon and
Washington provide that police "shall" arrest an abuser: 23 7 the use
of "shall" instead of "may" makes arrest mandatory.
238
The circumstances in which arrest is mandatory differ to some
extent in each state. In Maine, Iowa, Oregon and Washington, police
responding to domestic violence calls are directed to arrest when
they have probable cause to believe that a crime239 has been committed
or a protection order violated. 240 Connecticut mandates arrest when
234. See id.
235. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
237. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 1987) ("shall arrest");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)(b) to -.12(2)(d) (West Supp. 1987) (as amended by
1987 Iowa Acts, House File 591) ("shall arrest"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 770(5) (Supp. 1987) ("shall arrest"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.0](14) (West
Supp. 1987) ("shall arrest"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1984 & Supp. 1985)
("shall arrest"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.055(2) (1984) ("shall arrest"); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030(3)(a) (Supp. 1987) ("shall exercise arrest powers").
238. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 105 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Piqua Municipal Ct., Ohio
1952); Clark v. Carney, 71 Ohio App. 14, 16, 42 N.E.2d 938, 939 (1942).
239. The seriousness of the offense for which arrest is mandatory varies by state.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12 (2)(b) to -. 12(2)(d) (West Supp. 1987) (as
amended by 1987 Iowa Acts, House File 591) (mandatory arrest for acts of both
serious and aggravated misdemeanor assault); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 770(5) (Supp. 1987) (mandatory arrest for act of aggravated assault); OR. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 133.055(2) (1984) (mandatory arrest for assault or for act placing.
family member "in fear of imminent serious physical injury"); WASH. REV. CODE'
ANN. § 10.99.030(3)(a) (Supp. 1987) (mandatory arrest with reference to criteria
of § 10.31.100-felony assault, assault resulting in bodily injury whether observable
or not, within preceding four hours).
240. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (Supp. 1987) (mandatory
arrest for criminal violation of consent agreement or protection order); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 133.310(3) (1984) (mandatory arrest for violation of restraining order);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (mandatory arrest for knowing violation
of protection order). Iowa does not require arrest here, but rather, that the offender
be taken into custody and brought before a magistrate. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.11 (West Supp. 1987) (as amended by 1987 Iowa Acts, House File 591)
(peace officer "shall take [a] person into custody" upon probable cause to believe
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a family violence crime has been committed,2 41 without express ref-
erence to arrest for violations of a protection order. Minnesota and
North Carolina require arrest only for violations of protection or-
ders,2 42 and arrest remains permissive when no such order has been
obtained .243
Legislative goals behind mandatory arrest enactments include:
stronger and more unified police procedures; 24" greater protection
for the victim;2 45 speedier access to the courts;2 46 and identification
of "domestic violence as punishable behavior, thereby reducing the
frequency with which it occurs. ' 247
The impact of these mandatory arrest statutes is encouraging.2 48
Following implementation of mandatory arrest in Oregon, one study
showed that from 1977 to 1981 domestic homicides decreased by
ten percent, while at the same time non-domestic homicides increased
by ten percent. 249 In Duluth, Minnesota, an experiment testing various
that the person has "violated an order or approved consent agreement entered
under this chapter, a temporary or permanent protective order ... or any order
establishing conditions of release or a protective or sentencing order in a criminal
prosecution arising from a domestic abuse assault").
241. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 1987) (mandatory
arrest for commission of "family violence crime").
242. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14) (West Supp. 1987) (mandatory arrest
for violation of verifiable order of protection); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (1984 &
Supp. 1985) (same).
243. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341(1) (West Supp. 1987) (may arrest when
probable cause to believe that within past four hours person has assaulted or put
spouse in fear of imminent bodily injury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(b)(2) (Supp.
1985) (may arrest for act committed outside presence when probable cause to believe
felony committed, or misdemeanor when failure to arrest would result in non-
apprehension or danger to victim).
244. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 183, at 510-11 (testimony of Astrida Olds,
Chairman of the Connecticut Governor's Task Force on Family Violence). Olds
stated:
The proposed Bill has three major goals. One[,] it stiffens and unifies
police procedures ... [and] treats the crime of family violence as a
crime. [Two,] the Bill offers both intervention and protection for the
victim. Three, . . . the Bill would institute a speedy process to bring
cases before a judge to offer real protection to victims and treatment




247. John, Domestic Violence Legislation: An Impact Assessment, 11 J. POLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 451, 452 (1983) [hereinafter Jolin].
248. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
249. John, supra note 247, at 454. Furthermore, the decrease in the homicide
rate occurred at a time when one-third of Oregon's law enforcement agencies had
not yet implemented the provisions of the statute. See id.
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administrative policies showed that a policy of mandatory arrest
resulted in 175 arrests over a twelve-month period-a substantial
increase over the 107 arrests made when police were merely en-
couraged to arrest, and a marked increase over the twenty-two arrests
made under a policy of total officer discretion.20
It is also encouraging that many police officers seem willing to
comply with the new laws. 21 While some police officers initially
may have resisted curtailment of their discretion, 252 they generally
comply, possibly for the reason given by one Oregon officer: "rather
than having to go back [to the same household] three or four times
in one evening, [the officers] can nip [a domestic dispute] in the
bud." ' 2"1 Other officers may welcome mandatory arrest legislation
because it simplifies and clarifies2" their duties, for without a man-
datory arrest statute:
250. DULUTH ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, supra note 207, at 20. In addition,
under a policy of mandatory arrest, the percentage of minority men arrested declined
to a level closer to their actual percentage of population in Duluth. See id.
251. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text. But see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N
FOR WOMEN, STATE OF OREGON EXECUTIVE DEP'T, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN OREGON:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (Feb. 1979) (unpublished) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS]. The
report found that "[d]espite the Abuse Prevention Act, most law enforcement
agencies continue to follow traditional non-arrest policies." Id. at 10. The report
noted that many officers avoided making arrests by inciting the victim to object-
which, under then-existing Oregon law, nullified the mandatory arrest requirement.
See id. Oregon has since amended the statute so that mandatory arrest is no longer
contingent upon the victim's consent. See infra note 285. Moreover, the report
concludes that "[d]espite the fact that some police agencies are openly hostile about
the Abuse Prevention Act, the Act is not only essential; it is workable." See
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra, at 19.
252. Telephone interview with Officer Steven Morrow, Planning and Research
Division, Portland Oregon Police Bureau (Jan. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Morrow
Interview]. Similarly, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, there "was some resistance ...
from older cops who were adamant that a 'man's home is his castle' . . . [but]
we [the police department] just made it loud and clear that [mandatory arrest
orders must be followed] or you are in violation of the law yourself." Telephone
interview with Lieutenant Ed Scott, Family Violence Unit, Criminal Investigations
Division, Minneapolis, Minnesota Police Department (Feb. 26, 1987).
253. Morrow Interview, supra note 252. A police officer in Augusta, Maine,
expressed similar sentiment: mandatory arrest "makes it better-instead of going
back [to the same house] three or four times, you go back only once." Telephone
interview with Patrolman Levi Jackson, Department of Public Safety, Police Di-
vision, Augusta, Maine (Feb. 26, 1987). Oregon's Officer Morrow also observed
that since the state's adoption of a mandatory arrest law for domestic violence,
many officers have been compelled to comply by the knowledge that "if you don't
arrest and follow the law [you might] jeopardize your career," Morrow Interview,
supra note 252, whereas under the discretionary arrest provision that preceded the
mandatory arrest statute, "a lot of police officers didn't get involved . . . it was
lawful to arrest but they bypassed it." Id.
254. See Morrow Interview, supra note 252.
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[I]f they make an arrest too quickly, the officer is subject to
suit. On the other hand, if they make no arrest whatsoever,
they're subject to a suit on the other end and [the officers are]
saying please give us some clarification. Please give us some
legislation to help us do the right type of job .... 25
V. Recommendation: A Mandatory Arrest Statute for New York
Domestic violence legislation generally fits into one of three cat-
egories: provisions for non-legal remedies, such as shelters; improved
court procedures; and expanded authority for police.256 In New York
State, existing domestic violence legislation is limited to the first two
categories. 21 7 Moreover, the existing provisions were enacted in a
piecemeal fashion. 258 Police response, because it is guided only by
general arrest laws, 25 9 results in inconsistent enforcement on the
individual level. There is, furthermore, a state-wide lack of uni-
formity: specific domestic violence arrest policies have been for-
mulated by, and are confined to, several individual police
departments. 260 Given the widespread problem of domestic violence
in New York, the current approach is clearly insufficient. 261 To
combat the problem of domestic violence effectively, New York State
should enact comprehensive domestic violence legislation, similar to
that of its sister states, 262 directing law enforcement response,
263
requiring greater prosecutorial and judicial responsibility and af-
fording more protection to victims. 264
255. See Hearings, supra note 183, at 492 (testimony of John Kelly, Connecticut
Chief State's Attorney).
256. See FLEMUNG, supra note 15, at 255.
257. See supra notes 31-98 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 225-42 and accompanying text. New York's domestic violence
statute should be modeled after state statutes that make arrest mandatory. The
statute, however, also should incorporate some of the unique provisions found in
statutes that do not require arrest.
263. See supra notes 225-42 and accompanying text. In a 1986 Legislative Priorities
Survey, members of the New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence and
other domestic violence programs rated as the highest priority for legislative action
"[a] uniform statewide police response to domestic violence-which stresses that
domestic violence is to be treated no differently from any other call, and which
stresses the use of arrest." New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence
Newsletter (available from Katey Joyce, Director, Haven House, Buffalo, New York).
264. See infra notes 304-19 and accompanying text.
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The following is an outline of the provisions suggested for inclusion
in a comprehensive domestic violence statute for New York State. 265
A. Offenses and Persons Chargeable
A domestic violence statute should provide as much protection as
possible to all potential victims. 266 Thus, the statute must require
arrest for a number of offenses and must apply to a variety of
potential abusers .167
First, the terms "family" or "household" as currently defined in
Article 8 of the Family Court Act 268 are underinclusive. For the
purposes of comprehensive domestic violence legislation the definition
must be expanded to include unmarried cohabitants and former
cohabitants. 269 Second, the offenses for which a household member
may be arrested should be set forth as designated acts, or crimes,
of "domestic violence. '270 These offenses should be limited to acts
which cause physical injury or place the victim in fear of imminent
265. See infra notes 266-327 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
267. See id.
268. See supra notes 38, 57 and accompanying text.
269. In a number of states, domestic violence statutes protect cohabitants and
former cohabitants. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(a)(2) (West Supp.
1987) ("persons presently residing together or who have resided together in the
recent past") (footnote omitted); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762(4) (Supp.
1987) ("individuals presently or formerly living as spouses .... Holding oneself
out to be a spouse shall not be necessary to constitute 'living as spouses' "); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987) ("persons who are presently residing
together or who have resided together in the past"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.99.020(1) (Supp. 1987), 26.50.010(2) (1986) ("persons who are presently
residing together or who have resided together in the past"); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13700(b) (West Supp. 1987) ("cohabitant, former cohabitant, or a person
with whom the suspect . . .has or has had a dating or engagement relationship").
270. State provisions can include an entirely new category designated "family
violence offenses," for the purposes of obtaining protection orders. Nevertheless,
for a statute directing law enforcement response, designated acts of domestic violence
should be keyed into existing penal law provisions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-38a(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987) (" 'Family Violence Crime' means a crime
as defined in section 53a-24 which also constitutes family violence and shall include,
but not be limited to: ... [alssault ... kidnapping and unlawful restraint ...
sexual assault ... criminal mischief"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5)
(Supp. 1987) ("Arrest . . .[for] a violation of Title 17-A, section 208 [aggravated
assault]"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020(2) (Supp. 1987) (" 'Domestic Vi-
olence' includes but is not limited to any of the following crimes when committed
by one family or household member against another: ... [aissault ... [rieckless




physical injury, such as assault, 27' attempted assault, 272 menacing, 273
reckless endangerment ,274 rape, 27 and kidnapping .276 The legislation
would neither extend to physical contact which is too minor to be
included within the definition of assault,277 nor to harassment.27 8
B. Mandatory Arrest
In delegating to the police the authority to arrest for acts of
domestic violence, the statute should stipulate that police "shall
' 279
arrest a spouse whom they have probable cause to believe has
committed a crime280 against a household member. An explicit sta-
271. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00 to -. 10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987).
272. See id. § 110.00 (McKinney 1975).
273. See id. § 120.15.
274. See id. §§ 120.20 to -.25.
275. See id. §§ 130.25 to -.35. For a discussion of the New York Court of
Appeals' decision invalidating the marital rape exemption provision, see supra note
149. The penal law has not been amended to conform with the case law.
276. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.00 to -.25 (McKinney 1975). It should be
noted that the affirmative defense to kidnapping, see id. § 135.30 ("that ...
defendant was a relative of the person abducted, and ... his sole purpose was
to assume control of such person"), applies only to cases involving abduction of
a child by a parent. See id. practice commentary at 506.
277. The New York Penal Code designates three levels of assault: assault in the
first degree, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1975); assault in the second
degree, see id. § 120.05 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987); and assault in the third
degree, see id. § 120.00 (McKinney 1975). Third degree assault includes those acts
considered by the legislature to be least serious, yet still definable as assault:
A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes
such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person
by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument ....
Id.
278. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.25 to -.30 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1986).
279. For a discussion of the usage and significance of this language, see supra
notes 237-38 and acompanying text.
280. New York Penal Law defines "crime" as "a misdemeanor or a felony."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 1975). A police officer can therefore make
a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor even if it was not committed in his presence.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1981) ("a police officer may
arrest a person [without a warrant] for ... [a] crime when he has reasonable
cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his presence
or otherwise"). Because the New York Penal Law does not distinguish between
felonies and misdemeanors in authorizing warrantless arrests, a domestic violence
statute requiring arrest for misdemeanors in addition to felonies would not entail
radical restructuring of the underlying law. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney
1975). This is significant because an arrest standard "based on a misdemeanor/
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tutory reminder that the standard of probable cause is the same as
that used when the crime is between strangers2 ' may prevent the
tendency of police to implement a higher standard in domestic
violence cases. 28 2
Under current New York law, when a spouse violates a protection
order, presentation of a copy of the order to a police officer
constitutes probable cause to arrest the violator. 283 The statute should
require arrest in these instances. 2 4 New York now requires police
to notify victims of available legal remedies and services. 285 Legislation
should also encourage the police to provide immediate assistance,
including transportation to a hospital or shelter, upon the victim's
request, regardless of whether the situation requires them to arrest
the batterer. 28 6
The experiences of states that have enacted mandatory arrest
legislation suggest that the statute should include two additional
qualifications. First, arrest should not be conditioned upon the
victim's consent, 27 as she may be too intimidated by the batterer
to assent.288 Second, when an officer has probable cause to believe
that mutual assault has occurred, he should not be required to arrest
both spouses, but instead to arrest the spouse he believes was the
"primary physical aggressor. ' 28 9 Without this qualification, man-
felony distinction discourages arrest in most domestic abuse cases." Police Arrest
Power, supra note 224, at 2.
281. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
282. See id.
283. See supra note 63.
284. See supra notes 240, 242 and accompanying text.
285. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 812(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(6) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
286. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
287. "Conditioning the duty [to arrest] on the consent of the victim may render
the duty ineffective." Police Arrest Power, supra note 224, at 2; see CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 1987) ("decision to arrest and charge shall
not . . . be dependent on the specific consent of the victim"); see also 1979 Or.
Laws ch. 522, § 2 (clause providing "unless the victim objects" deleted from statute
mandating arrest).
288. A victim who is asked, in the presence of the abuser, if she objects to arrest
may be too afraid not to object. See Police Arrest Power, supra note 224, at 2.
289. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(b) (Supp. 1987). This
section provides:
When the officer has probable cause to believe that spouses, former
spouses, or other persons who reside together or formerly resided together
have assaulted each other, the officer is not required to arrest both
persons. The officer shall arrest the person whom the officer believes to
be the primary physical aggressor. In making this determination, the
officer shall make every reasonable effort to consider: (i) The intent to
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datory arrest of batterers may also result in the arrest of victims. 29°
Finally, the statute should include a provision formally requiring
increased police training291 and can, as many states have done, include




The statute should require police to take an arrested offender into
custody.2 93 Current New York law permits an officer who has made
a warrantless misdemeanor arrest to issue an appearance ticket in
protect victims of domestic violence under [Washington Revised Code
section] 10.99.010; (ii) the comparative extent of injuries inflicted or
serious threats creating fear of physical injury; and (iii) the history of
domestic violence between the persons involved.
Id. (emphasis added).
290. For example, in one incident occurring in Washington prior to the enactment
of that state's "primary physical aggressor" provision, see supra note 289, a woman
who had spat chicken soup at her husband, and consequently was beaten severely
by him, was arrested along with her husband. Telephone interview with Susan
Wilder Crane, Coordinator, Abused Woman Project, Evergreen Legal Services,
Seattle, Washington (Jan. 26, 1987).
291. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(g) (West Supp. 1987) (providing
for establishment of education and training program for police and state's attorneys
stressing "enforcement of criminal law in family violence cases"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13519 (West Supp. 1987) (providing for training of officers and guidelines
for response); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 507(7) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (implementing
police training program, including techniques for response to domestic violence).
The New York State Municipal Police Training Council has already increased
the number of domestic violence training hours required of recruits, from two-
and-one-half hours to 14 and one-half hours. See TASK FORCE SECOND REPORT,
supra note 28, at 10.
292. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(c) (West Supp. 1987) (peace
officer not civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from
domestic violence arrest based upon probable cause); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 133.315 (1984) (peace officer not civilly or criminally liable for making good
faith arrest under domestic violence statute); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-8 (Supp.
1987) (peace officer may not be held civilly liable for good faith, probable cause
arrest of domestic abuser).
The purpose of these provisions is to exempt officers from personal liability for
false arrest, thus decreasing the disincentive to arrest. These provisions do not
preclude suits against municipalities for failure to protect. See Police Arrest Power,
supra note 224, at 2.
293. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 133.310(3) (1984) ("peace officer shall
arrest and take into custody"); see also Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 709, 670
P.2d 137, 142 (1983) (construing Oregon Revised Statute § 133.310(3): "Even though
... arrested person is entitled to be released pending an eventual adjudication of
a criminal charge or contempt . . . temporary removal was deemed essential to
emphasize the seriousness of the court's order and to permit the victims of violence
to escape further immediate danger").
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
lieu of detaining the offender.2 94 In cases of domestic violence,
however, this practice could prove dangerous for a victim who may
thus be subjected to the batterer's immediate and intensified rage.2 9
Therefore, legislation should specifically prohibit the issuance of
citations for domestic violence misdemeanors.2 96
Other statutory pretrial protection for the victim generally takes
one of two forms: emergency orders of protection and specific
domestic violence bail provisions. 297 New York criminal courts are
currently authorized to issue a temporary order of protection as a
condition of pretrial release,2 98 or as a condition to release on bail.2 99
A bail provision3°° setting forth specific criteria 01 upon which the
court must rely in setting bail for domestic violence crimes, is
necessary, however, to prevent the immediate release of an offender
who is arrested and subsequently determined to be dangerous to the
294. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 140.27, 140.40 (McKinney 1981). Moreover,
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 150.20(1) permits police officers, who would
otherwise be authorized to make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, to issue an
appearance ticket instead. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20(1) (McKinney 1981).
295. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 (West Supp. 1987). This law provides
that an arresting officer may not issue a citation in lieu of arrest and detention
to a person charged with assaulting a spouse. See id. Only an officer in charge
of the police station, or the county sheriff in charge of the jail, may issue a
citation after the person has been brought in and it is determined that detention
is not necessary to prevent injury to a spouse or other person. See id.
297. See infra notes 298-304 and accompanying text. Minnesota has enacted a
unique provision, which makes trespass on the grounds of a facility providing
shelter services or transitional housing for battered women a gross misdemeanor.
See MNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.605(2) (West Supp. 1987).
298. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12 (McKinney 1984).
299. See id.
300. New York's Criminal Procedure Law includes a cursory bail provision. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(9) (McKinney 1984). Following the arrest of a
batterer and upon the filing of a petition or criminal complaint by the victim, the
court is authorized either to hold the defendant or to set bail. See id. When an
arrest is made for a violation of an order of protection, the court can impose
sanctions such as revoking a conditional discharge, bail or probation. See id.
§ 530.12(11); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 155-a (McKinney 1983) (cash bail
provision for family court appearance).
301. See, e.g. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-302 (1985) ("justice of the peace or
city judge may, in his discretion, establish and post a schedule of cash bail ...
except for offenses amounting to felonies and the offense of domestic abuse");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1 (1984) (suspect accused of crime of domestic violence
may be held in custody for reasonable period upon judicial determination that
appearance bond would not suffice to protect victim); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.251 (Anderson 1987) (considerations in setting bail in domestic violence cases
include: whether the person has a history of domestic violence acts, or court order
violations; the person's mental health; whether release poses a threat to someone;
whether high bail will interfere with current treatment or counseling).
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victim. 30 2 A provision that requires keeping a potentially dangerous
offender in custody for a "reasonable period of time,"3 3 would not
only protect the victim from further harm but would prevent her
from being intimidated against testifying. °4
D. Prosecutorial Program
Comprehensive domestic violence legislation should require en-
hanced prosecutorial efforts.3 5 Adoption in New York of a spouse
abuse prosecutor's program, similar to that recently enacted in Cal-
ifornia, would undoubtedly reduce complainant attrition and increase
conviction rates.3°6 California's statute establishes a funding and
guidance mechanism for the state's district attorney's offices. 0 7 The
statute sets forth criteria, including the severity of the offense charged
and the number of prior offenses charged, to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in domestic violence cases.30 8 The statute
further provides for "vertical prosecution" by "highly qualified ...
prosecutors,"30 9 and vertical counselor representation.310 Victim ad-
vocacy programs, similar to California's provision for counselor
representation, have been implemented in Seattle, Washington'" and
Duluth, Minnesota3"2 and by statute in Connecticut.313 The support
302. Because the wife batterer knows where to find the victim, short-term deten-
tion is more important in domestic violence cases than in incidents of stranger-to-
stranger violence. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 139, 141.
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1 (1984).
304. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 135 ("[i]mmediate post-arrest release enables
the abuser to return to the victim, and through either actual or threatened violence,
dissuade her from participating in prosecution").
305. Increased prosecution concomitant with increased arrests will have a mutually
reinforcing effect. Police may arrest wife batterers more often when they believe
that such offenders will actually be charged and prosecuted, see LERMAN, supra
note 3, at 15, and increased arrests may lead to more frequent prosecution. See
Police Arrest Power, supra note 224, at 1.
306. The Chief Prosecuting Attorney of Duluth, Minnesota, cites the adoption
of guidelines for prosecutors as contributing to a 67% increase in conviction rates
for domestic violence in Duluth over a three year period, from 1980 to 1983. See
DULUTH ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, supra note 207, at 21.
307. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.81 (West Supp. 1987).
308. See id. § 273.83.
309. Id. § 273.82. Vertical prosecution ensures that the prosecutor initially assigned
to a case stays with it throughout the criminal justice process.
310. See id.
311. See generally Roise & Tulonen, CITY OF SEATTLE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT
(undated and unpublished) (available from City of Seattle Law Department-Criminal
Division, Dexter Horton Building, Room 1055, 710-2nd Avenue, Seattle, Washington
98104) [hereinafter SEATTLE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT].
312. See generally DULUTH ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, supra note 207.
313. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c (West Supp. 1987) (establishing
family violence response and intervention units in the Connecticut judicial system
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of a trained domestic violence counselor, assigned to work with a
reluctant victim, 3 14 can greatly reduce complainant attrition3"5 and
thus should be implemented uniformly by statute.
E. Judicial Duties and Dispositional Alternatives
Some comprehensive domestic violence prevention statutes include
judicial guidelines.316 These may be implemented to emphasize to
the criminal courts "the serious nature of domestic violence.1 a17 The
provisions suggest that the court identify, from docket sheets, which
pending actions involve domestic violence.318 Possible judicial leniency
to prepare case reports for court; arrange services for victims and treatment for
offenders; and implement pre-trial family violence education program for offenders).
314. See SEATTLE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 311, at 14-17. Family
violence victim advocates work with reluctant victims to determine the source of
their reluctance, and help them to overcome it. See id. They explain the judicial
process to victims, emphasizing the positive aspects of prosecuting the offender
while stressing the defendant's need for treatment and the victim's need for pro-
tection. See id. Advocates. respond to a hostile victim by informing her that domestic
violence is a crime. They tell her that the city will charge the batterer even if she
refuses to testify, but that by involving herself in the process she can have an
impact. See id. An advocate works with the prosecutor to develop the case,
accompanies the victim to court, and refers her to counseling. See id. at 24.
The Duluth Abuse Intervention Project has similar goals and guidelines:
Advocates teach women how to use the courts, how to gather much of
the evidence needed for the trial, how to work with the prosecutor in
a case. Women have begun in unprecedented numbers to use the court
both because they now understand how to use it and because the court
is willing to take measures to protect them.
DULUTH ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, supra note 207, at 38..
315. Duluth's Chief Prosecutor estimated that in 1980, 20o of the cases filed
in his office by arresting officers or victims resulted in conviction. See DULUTH
ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT, supra note 207, at 21. By 1983, however, the
conviction rate reached 87%. See id. Several factors contributed to the increase in
convictions:
[Tihe use of advocates to work with women throughout the court process;
• .. the use of probable cause arrests which result in a high degree of
guilty pleas in contrast to victim-initiated charges; . . .the adoption of
prosecution guidelines which discourage city attorneys from dismissing
charges unless the victim refuses to testify and there is not sufficient
evidence to pursue a conviction without the victim's testimony; and ...
the availability of educational groups for women during the court process.
Id. at 21-22.
316. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-9 (West 1982) (entitled "Duties of
Court"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (Supp. 1987) (entitled, in relevant part,
"Court's powers-and duties in domestic violence actions"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.040 (Supp. 1987) (entitled "Restrictions upon and duties of court").
317. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.040 (Supp. 1987).
318. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.99.040 (Supp. 1987).
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may be reduced by including within a statutory scheme a requirement
that the court "not dismiss a charge involving domestic violence
at the request of the Victim unless it has reasonable cause to assume
that such a dismissal would benefit the victim." 3 '9
Because, in some cases, extended incarceration may not be an
essential factor in the deterrent effect of arrest,3 20 the statute can
make available to the court prescribed dispositional alternatives.
These may include: mandatory counseling concomitant with other
penalties;32' intermittent sentencing for less serious offenses;3 22 and
pretrial 23 or posttriaP24 diversion.3 25 Diversion, however, should be
available only for lesser offenses and when there is no lengthy history
of domestic violence.3 26 It should never substitute for incarceration
in cases of serious domestic abuse.3 27
319. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3(l)(e) (Supp. 1987).
320. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
321. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5(2) (Supp. 1987) ("the court, in addition
to penalties otherwise provided for by law, may require the defendant to participate
in treatment or therapy under the direction of an organization or individual ex-
perienced in domestic violence counseling").
The New York Penal Law currently allows the courts to impose a sentence of
conditional discharge when the court finds that "neither the public interest nor
the ends of justice would be served by a sentence of imprisonment." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 65.05 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987). Section 65.10 sets forth the conditions
of probation and of conditional discharge, which can include psychiatric treatment,
participation in an intervention program, and the requirements that the offender
"avoid injurious or vicious habits" and "meet ... family responsibilities." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987).
322. New York has an intermittent sentencing provision under its general sen-
tencing laws. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 85.00 (McKinney 1975) (revocable sentence
of imprisonment to be served on days or during certain periods of days, or both,
specified by court as part of sentence; limited to misdemeanor or D and E felony
convictions).
323. Pretrial diversion means that a prosecutor agrees to defer prosecution if
the defendant will seek counseling. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 2, at 64. If
the defendant successfully completes a course of treatment, the prosecutor drops
the charges. See id.
324. In posttrial diversion, counseling is made a condition of probation. See
id. The court then has the power to revoke probation and jail the defendant if
he fails to complete the program. See id.
325. The advantages of diversion include reduction of: (1) problems that are
concomitant with the long delay between the filing of a complaint and court
disposition; and (2) complainant attrition. See LERMAN, supra note 3, at 92, 111.
326. See, e.g., AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(G) (Supp. 1986) (no deferred
prosecution or probation if offender was previously found guilty, or had charges
dismissed, under this section); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.6 (West 1985) (defendant
eligible for diversion upon judicial determination, provided that defendant has not
been convicted of violent offense within past seven years, has not had parole or
probation revoked, and has not participated in diversion program within past five
years).
327. See ATTORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE, supra note 127, at 34 ("[in all
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VI. Conclusion
Assault and battery, even if committed in the privacy of the home,
are crimes. Traditionally, however, enforcement of existing laws
against these crimes has stopped short at the front door of the
family home. The New York Legislature has given victims of domestic
violence access to the criminal courts. Yet, access alone is insufficient
to compensate for the inadequate response of the criminal justice
system to domestic violence. New York needs comprehensive do-
mestic violence legislation to bring more batterers before the courts
and ensure that they are adequately sanctioned once there.
" 'Strengthening of legal sanctions against violence in the home is
a step toward stopping it in individual cases, and toward educating
the public that violence in the homes is as much a criminal act as
violence in a public place.' "328
Lisa R. Beck
cases when the victim has suffered serious injury, the convicted abuser should be
sentenced to a term of incarceration"). Because diversion channels domestic violence
out of the criminal process, overuse of such programs could perpetuate the societal
attitude that domestic violence is not criminal behavior. See RULE oF THUMB, supra
note 2, at 62, 65 (domestic violence is " 'a legal problem that should have legal
action and legal remedies such as prosecution' ") (citation omitted). Moreover,
failure to prosecute, as with pretrial diversion, can reaffirm the offender's belief
that he has not done anything wrong, and denies the victim the support of the
criminal justice system. See id. at 62.
328. Governor's Memorandum on Approval, supra note 56, at 1878.
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